GG v YY & Anor

A claim brought by a solicitor against a former client is not, merely for that reason, an abuse of process. A settlement or undertaking cannot ordinarily be set aside, or a claim struck out, on an interim application based on unpleaded allegations of duress. Irrelevant and scandalous witness statements may be struck out as an abuse of process under CPR r.3.1(2)(m). Restrictions on publication must be directed to identified objectionable allegations. A general prohibition on publishing an entire witness statement may be both too wide and too narrow.

The claimant, a solicitor, brought proceedings concerning harassment and related publication of personal allegations by his former client and another defendant. The defendants applied to strike out the claim, set aside earlier orders and undertakings, and seek damages. The claimant sought further procedural orders and restrictions on disclosure or use of witness statements filed by the defendants and the second defendant’s wife.

The central issues were whether the defendants had shown any basis for striking out or setting aside the earlier settlement and undertakings, and whether the witness statements were irrelevant, abusive or subject to restrictions under the Civil Procedure Rules.

1. Defendants’ applications. The applications to strike out the claim and set aside the earlier orders and undertakings were dismissed and declared totally without merit. It is not an abuse of process for a solicitor to sue a former client. The First Defendant’s grievances about the earlier boundary litigation did not provide a basis for striking out the present claim.
2. Settlement and duress. The Second Defendant had not applied to set aside the settlement on the ground of duress. In any event, the evidence did not arguably establish duress. Such an issue would require determination at trial. Even if proved, duress would lead to setting aside the settlement so that the claim could be defended; it would not justify striking out the claim.
3. Witness statements. The witness statements of the defendants and the Second Defendant’s wife contained extensive irrelevant allegations and were irrelevant to the applications for which they were filed. They were therefore an abuse of the court’s process and likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. The court struck them out under CPR r.3.1(2)(m).
4. The court accepted that the material arguably resembled the abusive and irrelevant allegations described by Rix LJ in Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors (No 1) [2011] EWCA Civ 123. Any future injunction would have to identify the nature of the allegations to be prohibited. A prohibition covering an entire witness statement would be too wide because not every passage amounted to harassment, and too narrow because the same material could be republished in another form.
5. Disclosure and use. The restrictions in CPR r.32 did not by themselves prevent the makers of witness statements from disclosing their own statements. Any alleged breach of the Second Defendant’s undertaking had to be determined in committal proceedings. The claimant was given an opportunity to propose amendments to the claim and an appropriately focused injunction.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.