Jones, R (on the application of) v Judicial Appointments Commission

The Judicial Appointments Commission may adopt a consistent policy for assessing good character under section 63(3) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. A policy treating more than six current penalty points as normally preventing selection is rationally connected to maintaining public confidence in judicial standards. The policy remains subject to public law review and must preserve a discretion to depart from the normal position. That discretion may properly focus on matters relating to the convictions. The Commission must actually exercise it, but need not treat unrelated features of an applicant’s career or personal history as overriding otherwise rational conclusions about current convictions. The distinction between appointing a new judge and permitting an existing part-time judge to continue sitting is legitimate.

The claimant, a solicitor and deputy District Judge, applied for a full-time District Judge appointment. Despite being assessed as an outstanding candidate, his application was rejected because he had seven current penalty points arising from two motoring offences. The Judicial Appointments Commission relied on its good-character guidance and section 63(3) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.

He sought judicial review on three grounds: that the six-plus points policy was irrational; that it had not been properly applied; and that the individual decision was irrational. The Administrative Court considered the lawfulness and application of the policy, the exercise of the Commission’s discretion, and the relevance of his continuing work as a deputy District Judge.

1. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted, but the claim was dismissed.

2. The statutory requirement that an appointment be made only where the selecting body is satisfied that the candidate is of good character gives the Judicial Appointments Commission responsibility for determining an appropriate policy. It may adopt principles directed to maintaining public confidence in judicial standards and requiring high standards of behaviour. Such a policy is subject to public law review.

3. The policy that six or fewer current penalty points may be disregarded, but that more than six points will normally prevent selection, was lawful. The Commission was entitled to draw a line which it considered proportionate, even though any line might appear arbitrary to candidates just beyond it. The word “normally” preserved a discretion to depart from the usual position.

4. The Commission had exercised that discretion. Its decision letter and review decision showed that it had considered both versions of the guidance, the claimant’s representations, the particular offences and his proposal for temporary placement on the section 94 list. It was entitled to confine departures from the policy principally to mitigation relating to the convictions.

5. The decision that the claimant was not of good character was not irrational. The continuation of an existing deputy judge’s authorisation and the appointment of a new full-time judge involved different responsibilities and different decision-makers. Matters unrelated to the circumstances of the convictions could not make an otherwise rational decision Wednesbury unreasonable.

6. The court observed that clearer reasons should have been given explaining why the discretion was not exercised in the claimant’s favour, and that the relationship between the 2011 and 2013 guidance could have been explained more clearly. Those shortcomings did not invalidate the decision.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment states that Hickinbottom J ordered a rolled-up hearing of permission and the substantive claim on 10 April 2014.