Feest v South West Strategic Health Authority & Ors

Limitation provisions in an international convention must be construed by reference to the wording and international purpose of the convention, without importing domestic assumptions that limitation normally bars the remedy rather than extinguishing the right.

Articles 14 and 16 of the Athens Convention apply to a contribution claim against a carrier because such a claim depends on the carrier’s liability for the passenger’s injury. The two-year period and three-year long-stop in Article 16 bar the bringing of the action and extinguish the underlying right. Any resulting unfairness is a matter for legislation, not a reason to adopt a different construction.

The claimant suffered spinal injury during a corporate boat trip. She sued her employer, the appellant, within the applicable domestic limitation period. The appellant brought a Part 20 contribution claim against the boat’s owner and operator.

A district judge granted summary judgment and dismissed the contribution claim, holding that the Athens Convention limitation period extinguished the carrier’s liability. The appellant obtained permission to appeal on the question whether Article 16 barred only the remedy or extinguished the right, and whether the Convention applied to contribution proceedings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The district judge’s reasoning was erroneous in treating the distinction between a prescriptive bar and a procedural bar as semantic, but the result was correct.
2. Articles 14 and 16 of the Athens Convention apply to a contribution claim. A contribution claim exists only if the proposed contributor is liable for the same damage. It is therefore an action for contribution to damages arising from the passenger’s personal injury. Article 14 is not confined to an action brought by the passenger personally.
3. The Convention must be construed on broad principles of general acceptation. Domestic common-law assumptions that limitation provisions are procedural, and that they bar the remedy without extinguishing the right, must be put aside. The actual words, their international context and the need for uniformity are the starting point.
4. Article 16.1 means that no action for damages arising from personal injury may be brought against the carrier after two years from disembarkation. This includes a contribution action. Article 16.3 has the same substantive effect as a long-stop: after three years, an action under the Convention cannot be brought. The provisions therefore extinguish the right of action, rather than merely barring the remedy.
5. The domestic-voyage extension made by the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (Domestic Carriage) Order 1987 did not create a different regime. The Convention’s wording has the same meaning for domestic and international carriage. The potential unfairness of preventing contribution proceedings does not offend public policy and cannot justify circumventing the Convention’s fixed periods. The Part 20 claim was accordingly dismissed.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): permission to appeal granted and appeal dismissed. The summary judgment dismissing the Part 20 contribution claim was upheld.
• Bristol County Court: DJ Britton granted summary judgment to Bay Island Voyages and dismissed the Part 20 claim on 19 July 2013. Permission to appeal was refused.