Paolo, R (on the application of) v City of London Magistrates Court

A claimant seeking judicial review must file promptly and, in any event, within the applicable three-month period. The court may extend time, but a claimant who gives a misleading explanation for delay cannot generally expect the discretion to be exercised in his favour. The administration of justice requires the court to be able to trust the information placed before it, particularly in judicial review proceedings where evidence is ordinarily documentary. Although the grant of a search warrant engages fundamental interests, those interests do not displace the separate and fundamental requirement of due administration of justice.

The claimant challenged a warrant issued by the City of London Magistrates’ Court for the search of his premises. He alleged non-disclosure by the police and error in the magistrate’s belief that relevant evidence was likely to be found there.

The warrant was issued on 15 August 2011. The claim was filed on 14 November 2012, together with an application for an extension of time. The claimant stated that he had only become aware of grounds for challenge after discovering the judgment in R (on the application of Helidon Vuciterni) v Brent Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWHC 2140 (Admin). The court considered whether that explanation was misleading and whether time should be extended.

1. Time limit. Under section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court may refuse relief where undue delay would be likely to cause substantial hardship, substantially prejudice another’s rights or be detrimental to good administration. CPR 54.5(1) requires a judicial review claim to be filed promptly and in any event within three months after the grounds first arose. CPR 3.1(2) gives the court power to extend time.
2. The claim was filed approximately 15 months after the warrant and more than four months after the decision in Vuciterni [2012] EWHC 2140 (Admin). The claimant’s police interview showed that he already knew of Vuciterni’s judicial review proceedings and their apparent success at the permission stage. His assertion that he had only later discovered the judgment was therefore misleading.
3. The court distinguished R (on the application of Matthew Goode) v Nottingham Crown Court [2013] EWHC 1726 (Admin). In that case the delay was unexplained, but the court nevertheless considered the merits because fundamental interests were engaged. Here, the explanation was positively misleading, so the same approach did not follow.
4. The liberty of the subject and the protection of the home are fundamental interests in the grant of search warrants, as recognised in R (G) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 3331 (Admin). However, due administration of justice is also a fundamental interest. A claimant who misleads the court when seeking a discretionary extension of time is generally disqualified from receiving it.
5. The application for an extension of time was refused and the judicial review claim was dismissed.

The judgment does not state an appellate history for this claim. Permission to bring the judicial review had previously been granted on a renewed application, with delay left open for determination.