Sweeney v Westminster Magistrates Court & Anor

A search warrant must identify, so far as practicable, the articles or persons sought and must enable the issuing justice, the executing officers and affected persons to understand the limits of the search. An information supporting a warrant under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 must identify the statutory requirements relied upon, explain the facts said to satisfy each requirement, and make full and frank disclosure of material matters. The issuing justice must independently assess the statutory criteria and give reasons. Material omissions concerning prior regulatory inspections, co-operation, permit transfers and interview history may undermine the warrant. Failure to comply with these safeguards renders the warrant and resulting search unlawful.

The claimant sought judicial review of a search warrant issued by Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 10 May 2013 under section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The warrant authorised searches of his home, business premises, other individuals’ homes and an accountants’ office in an investigation into alleged waste offences and money laundering.

Permission was granted on two grounds. The claimant argued that the warrant was excessively broad and failed to identify the articles sought as required by section 15(6)(b), and that the supporting information failed to identify the offences and relevant facts with sufficient particularity and omitted material matters. The central issues were whether the warrant and information satisfied sections 8 and 15 of PACE.

1. The warrant was quashed. The court declared that the warrant and the search conducted under it were unlawful because the requirements of sections 8 and 15 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 had not been met.
2. A warrant must be sufficiently precise to operate as a free-standing document. Although the scope of an investigation may justify a broad description, the warrant must identify the offences or investigation, define the relevant business activities and identify, so far as practicable, the categories of material sought. The phrases referring to evidence in any form and businesses varying from or linked to named businesses left the warrant impermissibly wide. It was not limited to documents relevant to the alleged waste or money-laundering offences and breached section 15(6)(b).
3. The information failed to identify which particular indictable offence was alleged against any individual or how the stated facts constituted an offence under sections 327 to 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The statutory requirements under section 8(1) were not set out or linked to the facts relied upon. The court could not readily understand how the magistrates had reached the conclusion that the statutory conditions were satisfied.
4. The ex parte application also failed to make full and frank disclosure. Relevant omissions included the Environment Agency’s inspection and information-gathering powers, its previous inspections and receipt of co-operation, its approval of permit transfers, and the history of correspondence and interviews. Those matters were relevant to whether entry required a warrant, whether the search might be frustrated, and whether the underlying waste offences were established or disputed.
5. The absence of contemporaneous notes, a recording and reasons for the magistrates’ decision compounded the deficiencies. The statutory safeguards required independent judicial scrutiny and a reliable record of the basis for the warrant.

The judgment itself records no appeal or earlier judicial decision determining the present claim. Permission had been granted by HH Judge Pelling QC on Grounds 3 and 5.