Reachlocal UK Ltd & Anor v Bennett & Ors

Relief from sanctions requires consideration of all the circumstances, with particular weight given to efficient and proportionate litigation and compliance with rules and orders. A serious and substantially delayed failure to serve a defence will require a convincing explanation. Litigants in person remain subject to procedural obligations, although some latitude may be appropriate for unfamiliarity with court procedures. The court must also consider whether refusing relief would disproportionately restrict freedom of expression, particularly in defamation proceedings. Dishonesty, repeated non-compliance and an unconvincing explanation may justify refusal. A short delay accompanied by a substantive attempt to respond, and no established dishonesty, may make debarring a litigant disproportionate.

The claimants brought proceedings alleging libel, slander, malicious falsehood, breach of confidence, breach of contract and conspiracy. Interim relief was granted and the defendants were directed to serve defences by 22 April 2014, later extended to 6 May 2014 with a debarring sanction. No defences were served.

The first and third defendants, acting in person, applied for relief from sanctions. The first defendant relied on personal and family difficulties. The third defendant relied on a letter sent to the court shortly after the first deadline, which set out the substance of his position but did not comply with the formal requirements for a defence. The central issue was whether the circumstances justified permitting either defendant to defend the claim.

1. Applicable principles. Under CPR r.3.9, the court had to consider all the circumstances, including the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. The guidance in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 795 CA required particular weight to be given to those matters. The breaches were serious, repeated and substantially out of time.
2. Litigants in person and expression. A litigant in person is not exempt from procedural rules, although some greater latitude may be appropriate to reflect unfamiliarity with court processes. Hobson v West London Law Solicitors [2013] EWHC 4425 (QB) was consistent with that approach. The court also had to consider Article 10 of the Convention and its duties under sections 6(1) and 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, since debarring a defendant in a defamation claim may restrict freedom of expression.
3. First defendant. The default was serious. The explanation was unconvincing because the defendant had continued business activities during the relevant period. His admitted lies to the court and to the claimants’ solicitors, together with other failures to comply with orders, materially weakened his application. His possible motive did not defeat a truth defence to libel, consistently with Holley v Smyth [1998] QB 726 CA, but motive could remain relevant to other causes of action.
4. Third defendant. Although his letter was late and did not satisfy the formal requirements of CPR r.16.5, CPR Part 22 and the Practice Direction to Part 16, it set out the substance of his answer. The delay was relatively short, and the court could not positively find that he had lied. In light of his partial attempt to comply, his status as a litigant in person and the potential restriction on expression, debarring him would be disproportionate.
5. The first defendant’s application was refused and he remained debarred from defending. The third defendant’s application was allowed and he was relieved from the sanction.

This was a first-instance application for relief from sanctions. Directions were made by Sir David Eady, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 28 March 2014, and by Tugendhat J on 30 April 2014. The applications were heard and determined by the High Court on 23 June 2014.