The Professional Standards Authority v The General Chiropractic Council & Anor

On a statutory appeal under section 29 of the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, the court must decide whether the regulatory decision was wrong or involved a serious procedural or other irregularity. Under-charging may amount to such an irregularity where further allegations arise from the same episode and are directly connected with the existing charge. Allegations of dishonesty should be expressly pleaded before dishonesty is relied upon. A sanction may be unduly lenient where the tribunal fails to address public protection, including the need for a review of a suspension where there is no insight, remorse, remediation or assurance against repetition. The case should then be remitted for a fresh hearing.

The Professional Standards Authority referred to the High Court a decision of the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Chiropractic Council concerning Cameron Briggs. The Committee had found that he practised while registered as non-practising and without professional indemnity insurance, and imposed a six-month suspension without review.

The Authority alleged under-charging, undue leniency and inadequate reasons. The GCC consented to remission for a fresh hearing with additional allegations, including dishonesty. The central issues were whether the further allegations should have been referred, whether the sanction was unduly lenient, and whether the Committee gave adequate reasons.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to a freshly constituted panel of the Professional Conduct Committee for rehearing.

1. Applicable appellate standard. A referral under section 29 of the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 is treated as an appeal. Applying 120041 EWCA Civ 1356, the appeal should be allowed where the regulatory decision was wrong or there was a serious procedural or other irregularity. Undue leniency requires consideration of whether the decision had due regard to public safety and the reputation of the profession.
2. Under-charging. The proposed allegations arose from the same episode as the existing charge and were directly connected with it. The evidence plainly supported allegations that the registrant knew his registration and insurance status and had acted dishonestly in representations to his employers. The failure to refer those allegations was a serious error. Dishonesty could not properly be relied upon under the duty of honesty and integrity unless it had been pleaded in the charge.
3. Sanction. The six-month suspension was unduly lenient even apart from the additional dishonesty allegations. The registrant lacked insight, remorse and remediation, and the Committee identified a risk of repetition. The absence of a review meant that the regulator had no opportunity to assess whether he understood the risks created by practising while improperly registered and uninsured.
4. Reasons. The Committee’s reasons were intelligible and sufficient, bearing in mind that they were the reasons of a regulatory panel rather than a court. The challenge based on inadequate reasons therefore failed.
5. At the rehearing, the registrant was entitled to dispute the dishonesty allegations and advance any relevant mitigation.

The judgment records no earlier judicial decision in the same proceedings. The Authority referred the Professional Conduct Committee’s decision of 5 November 2013 to the High Court under section 29 of the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002.