Cooper-Hohn v Hohn

Financial remedy proceedings remain private under rule 27.10 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, and the admission of accredited media does not create an unrestricted right to report everything heard in court. The confidentiality attaching to compelled financial disclosure remains an important consideration, but it does not justify a blanket prohibition on reporting. The court must balance privacy and confidentiality, open justice, and the media’s freedom of expression. Restrictions should be tailored to the material requiring protection and must be proportionate. In the circumstances, reporting restrictions protecting personal and business financial information were justified, while a total embargo was too wide.

The judgment concerned a case-management application arising during private financial remedy proceedings between Jamie Anne Cooper-Hohn and Christopher Anthony Hohn. Accredited members of the press were entitled to attend under rule 27.11 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The husband contended that nothing could be reported without a specific application and permission. The media contended that, absent an order, they could report what they heard, subject to any statutory restrictions. The central issue was the extent to which the media could report evidence and submissions in private financial remedy proceedings, including the effect of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 and the implied undertaking of confidentiality.

1. The media application was granted in part. The court refused the husband’s proposed blanket embargo but imposed reporting restrictions in the terms of his fallback draft order, covering the parties’ personal and business financial information, subject to information already in the public domain.
2. Financial remedy hearings remained private under rule 27.10 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. Media attendance under rule 27.11 did not convert them into public hearings, nor did it confer an unrestricted right to report the evidence or documents deployed during the hearing.
3. The confidentiality attaching to financial disclosure remained an important protection. Parties were subject to a heavy duty of full, frank, complete and up-to-date disclosure, and the preservation of confidentiality encouraged candid evidence and assisted the court’s quasi-inquisitorial assessment under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. That protection extended beyond price-sensitive information to detailed financial evidence and explanations.
4. The implied undertaking did not justify a blanket approach. The court had to conduct a fact-specific balancing exercise involving the confidential nature of the proceedings, the statutory reporting framework, open justice, and the competing rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, with Article 6 considerations also relevant. Neither Convention right automatically prevailed.
5. The court proceeded on the assumption that section 1(4) of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 applied and treated it as providing a mechanism for permitting or restricting publication. The court also retained power under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its inherent jurisdiction to regulate reporting.
6. Given the importance of protecting the parties’ financial privacy, the risk of inhibiting full and frank evidence, and the limited public benefit of contemporaneous publication, tailored restrictions on financial information were proportionate. The application to prohibit all reporting was too wide.