The Project Management Institute, R (On the Application Of) v The Minister For The Cabinet Office & Ors

The exercise of prerogative power to grant a Royal Charter is amenable to judicial review according to its subject matter. A commercial competitor cannot generally challenge the decision merely because the grant may improve the rival’s market position. The claimant must identify an affected private-law right, an existing benefit or advantage, or an assurance protected by public law. Published Royal Charter criteria are guidance where the policy reserves a wide discretion, states that applications are decided on their merits, and makes satisfaction of the criteria non-automatic. Such guidance does not ordinarily create a substantive legitimate expectation. A recommendation is not irrational merely because the decision-maker makes a broad-brush judgment on uncertain evidence, provided the conclusion is reasonably open on the material considered.

The claimant, a United States project-management organisation, challenged the recommendation by a Committee of Privy Councillors that a Royal Charter should be granted to the Association for Project Management. The challenge alleged irrationality, breach of a substantive legitimate expectation arising from the Privy Council’s published criteria, apparent bias and predetermination. The claimant argued that the Charter would enhance the interested party’s competitive position and indirectly promote Government interests in project-management qualifications. The Court considered the nature of Royal Charters, the amenability of prerogative decisions to judicial review, the claimant’s standing and the merits of the alleged policy departure.

Claim dismissed.

1. The grant or refusal of a Royal Charter is an exercise of prerogative power, but it is amenable to judicial review according to the subject matter of the decision rather than its source. The recommendation to grant the Charter was therefore reviewable in principle: [1985] 1 AC 374.

2. The claimant could not establish the interest required to challenge the decision on the grounds relied upon. The grant would alter no private-law right or obligation, deprive the claimant of no benefit or advantage previously permitted by the decision-maker, and withdraw no benefit covered by an assurance. A possible improvement in a competitor’s market position was insufficient, particularly where no competition-law infringement was alleged.

3. The published criteria were guidance for the exercise of a wide discretion. The guidance stated that applications were dealt with on their merits, that the criteria were ordinarily expected rather than rigid requirements, and that satisfying them did not automatically result in a grant. It was therefore not a clear, unambiguous and unqualified representation capable of creating a substantive legitimate expectation: [1990] 1 WLR 1545.

4. The statement that a proposal made controversial by a counter-petition was unlikely to succeed was advice, not a binding criterion or policy requirement. Its omission from the ministerial digest was immaterial. The observation concerning proportionality in [2004] 2 AC 368 did not itself establish a legal test; the relevant test was identified in [2007] 1 AC 167.

5. In any event, the Committee was entitled to conclude that the criteria and public-interest case were sufficiently made out. It could make a judgment on whether project management was a unique profession, the size of the eligible field, degree qualifications and the significance of membership overlap. The evidence did not require statistical analysis of the effect of Chartered status. The Committee was entitled to rely on governmental experience, the views of respondents and the absence of evidence that the proposed register would be operated anti-competitively.

6. The apparent-bias claim failed. Government’s possible financial interest did not disqualify an executive decision-maker exercising a non-judicial function, absent a specific administrative-law breach: [2003] 2 AC 295. The predetermination allegation also failed. Earlier departmental support and cooperative dealings did not prevent a fresh decision by Ministers, and the evidence showed safeguards intended to secure an independent determination.

7. The claim was dismissed. The parties were invited to make written submissions on costs if costs were not agreed.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment records that permission was granted on two grounds by Philips J and refused on three further grounds; an attempt to renew two refused grounds was abandoned.