Kirklees Metropolitan District Council v A Hungarian mother

[2014] EWHC 2496 (Fam)

Case details

Case citations
[2014] EWHC 2496 (Fam) · [2014] CN 1863
Court
High Court (Family Division)
Judgment date
26 February 2014
Judgment text

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Subjects
Family Care proceedings Adoption and permanence
Keywords
care order placement order non-consensual adoption last resort Children Act 1989 section 31(2) threshold criteria linear thinking long-term foster care habitual residence Brussels II Revised Article 15
Outcome
judgment for the applicant: final care order made with a plan for adoption; placement-order application adjourned
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Meeting the statutory threshold does not automatically require a care order or adoption. The court must consider the full range of available orders and determine whether the child’s welfare requires intervention. Non-consensual adoption is a last resort and is permissible only where nothing else will do. The court must avoid linear reasoning and compare realistic alternatives, including long-term foster care. The decision must focus on the child’s welfare, need for permanence, and the availability and suitability of family or other carers.

Factual background

The local authority sought a final care order for a seven-month-old child whose mother had returned to Hungary. The child had been exposed to serious risks arising from the mother’s history of exploitation, trauma, mental disorder and inability to provide consistent care. The jurisdiction issue had previously been determined by Bodey J, who found that the child was habitually resident in the United Kingdom. The court considered the agreed statutory threshold, the mother’s care capacity, possible Hungarian and family placements, long-term foster care, and a care plan for adoption.

Held

  1. The agreed threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 was satisfied. On the written evidence, the child was likely to suffer significant physical and emotional harm attributable to the mother’s care when proceedings began. The later evidence from the residential assessment, including the injury caused to the child and the mother’s inability to bond with or care for him, supported that conclusion.
  2. Meeting threshold did not determine the order. The court had to consider no order and the range of private-law and public-law alternatives. Per Re B-S, a care plan for non-consensual adoption had to be treated as a last resort, available only where nothing else would do.
  3. The court rejected linear reasoning of the kind identified in Re G. It separately assessed the mother, father, grandmother and proposed family friend, and found that none could provide safe and adequate care. The mother’s difficulties were sufficiently severe that she could not care for the child then or for the foreseeable future.
  4. Long-term foster care was considered as the realistic alternative to adoption. It was rejected because the child required a permanent, stable and undisrupted home, whereas long-term foster care would leave him with a corporate parent and would involve a further move from his foster carers.
  5. The court considered the child’s welfare checklist, his need for secure and consistent care, his Hungarian and Romany heritage, and the absence of any suitable relative or Hungarian placement. Hungary had been given an opportunity to seek a transfer under Brussels II Revised, Article 15, but no application was made.
  6. The jurisdiction decision was unchallenged. A final care order was made with a plan for adoption. The placement-order application was adjourned to allow service on the mother.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The judgment was at first instance. The court recorded that Bodey J had previously determined that the child was habitually resident in the United Kingdom and that the court had jurisdiction. That determination was unchallenged.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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