Krusinina v Prosecutors General Office of the Republic of Latvia

Article 8 proportionality in extradition cases requires a fact-specific balancing exercise. The public interest in extradition is weighty, but its force varies with the seriousness of the offence, delay and the circumstances in which extradition is sought. A child’s best interests are a primary consideration, particularly where extradition would separate the child from a sole or primary carer.

Exceptionality is an outcome, not a legal test. The court must carefully examine the likely effect on the child and whether the public interest can be met without causing disproportionate harm. Where a suspended sentence has been activated in unusual circumstances, and prolonged separation would cause profound harm to a dependent child, extradition may be disproportionate.

The appellant challenged, under section 26(1) of the Extradition Act 2003, a District Judge’s order for her extradition to Latvia. Extradition was sought so that she could serve a six-year suspended sentence activated after she failed to attend a Latvian court hearing.

The appellant was the sole carer of her 14-year-old daughter, who lived and attended school in England. The appeal raised the single question whether extradition would be a proportionate interference with the family life of the appellant and her daughter under Article 8.

1. Appeal allowed. The court applied the Article 8 principles stated in Norris v Government of the United States of America (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9, HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 and ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4.
2. Exceptionality was not a test. The question was whether the interference with private and family life was outweighed by the public interest in extradition. That public interest remained weighty, but its weight depended on the seriousness of the offence and could be reduced by delay. The assessment was fact-specific.
3. The best interests of the child were a primary consideration. Particular care was required where extradition would remove a sole or primary carer. The court had to examine the practical consequences for the child and consider whether the public interest could be satisfied by measures causing less harm.
4. The original offence was serious, but the Latvian court had initially suspended the sentence. The appellant had been permitted to leave Latvia during the suspension, had maintained contact with the authorities and had not been found to be a fugitive. The sentence appeared to have been activated because she did not attend a hearing despite having valid reasons, having been told that non-attendance would not hinder consideration of her statement, and without being expressly told that activation might be considered.
5. The appellant’s extradition would leave her teenage daughter effectively without parental care for almost six years. Existing arrangements with the adult sister were precarious and unsustainable, and communication with the appellant in Latvia would be severely limited. The resulting harm to the child and the appellant outweighed the public interest in extradition in these unusual circumstances.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order was allowed.
• District Judge: On 16 April 2014, District Judge Devas ordered extradition to Latvia. The High Court held that extradition was disproportionate under Article 8.