Bhatnagar v General Medical Council

Under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983, the court exercises an original jurisdiction when reviewing an interim order made by an Interim Orders Panel. It gives appropriate weight to the Panel’s expertise, but may interfere if satisfied that the order was wrong.

An interim suspension based on the public-interest ground is an exceptional remedy. The Panel must assess necessity and proportionality, considering the seriousness and scope of the allegations, public confidence, the practitioner’s interests and whether conditions would suffice. A reviewing Panel must exercise its own judgment on all current circumstances, including genuinely new information.

The claimant, a consultant ophthalmologist, applied under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 to terminate an interim suspension order imposed by the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal Service’s Interim Orders Panel on 7 April 2014.

Earlier Panels had imposed interim suspension and later interim conditions. The claimant challenged the 7 April 2014 decision, arguing that the allegations were not materially new, that he had a legitimate procedural expectation arising from the earlier orders, and that the Panel had failed to consider interim conditions.

The central issue was whether the renewed interim suspension was unnecessary, disproportionate or otherwise wrong.

1. Application dismissed. The court exercised its original jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983. It gave appropriate weight to the expert Panel but was entitled to interfere if satisfied that its order was wrong.
2. The Panel was required to exercise its own independent judgment after considering all the circumstances, including new information available at the review. The use of the word new in the Panel’s reasons did not invalidate its decision. The Rule 7 particulars and supporting witness evidence gave greater detail and substance to allegations, including the insurance allegations, which had not previously been formulated in that way.
3. The public-interest assessment required a high degree of justification. The court accepted that interim suspension is likely to be appropriate only in a relatively rare case and that proportionality is of central importance. The practitioner’s ability to earn a living, reputation and opportunity to demonstrate continued competent practice had to be weighed against the public interest.
4. The Panel was entitled to apply the reasonable-onlooker approach. Having regard to the wide-ranging and extremely serious allegations concerning conduct and probity, it could conclude that a properly informed member of the public would be surprised and offended if the practitioner continued unrestricted practice while the allegations remained unresolved.
5. The Panel had not failed to consider interim conditions. It was entitled to conclude that neither revocation nor continuation of conditions was appropriate or proportionate in the current circumstances. The interim suspension order was therefore not unnecessary, disproportionate or wrong.

The judgment describes an earlier application in the same litigation. Edwards-Stuart J dismissed that application on 11 November 2013: [2013] EWHC 3412 (Admin). Subsequent Interim Orders Panels imposed conditions before the Panel’s decision of 7 April 2014 to reinstate interim suspension. The present application was dismissed.