St Christopher School (Letchworth) Ltd v Schymanski & Anor

A school’s contractual duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in a pupil’s education and welfare does not automatically incorporate every proposed pastoral, safeguarding or communications obligation. Implied terms must satisfy the established necessity, obviousness, clarity and consistency requirements. A breach which entitles a party to terminate does not discharge fees already accrued. Allegations of direct racial discrimination require proof of less favourable treatment and that the treatment was on racial grounds. Where competing privacy and freedom of expression rights arise, neither has automatic precedence; the court must assess their comparative importance and proportionality in the particular case.

The claimant independent school sought unpaid fees of £23,231.10 for the spring and summer terms of 2009–10 in respect of the defendants’ three sons. The defendants denied liability and counterclaimed damages, alleging breaches of three education contracts, failures concerning special educational needs, welfare, supervision, complaints handling and safeguarding, and racial discrimination and bullying.

The defendants withdrew the boys after reading a report concerning the death of another child and engaged private tutors. The court determined the factual allegations, the contractual effect of the school’s terms and policies, the discrimination allegations, causation and loss, costs, reporting restrictions and permission to appeal.

1. Contractual terms. The three boys were subject to three separate contracts. The express obligation to exercise reasonable skill and care in education and welfare provided a sufficient contractual setting for the pleaded breaches. The additional implied terms were not implied because they were unnecessary, redundant or too vague. The principles in AG of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988 were applied.
2. Fees and consideration. There had been no total failure of consideration: the boys had received education under each contract. Even if a breach had entitled the defendants to terminate prospectively, it would not have discharged fees which had already accrued due.
3. Facts and discrimination. The school had not breached any contract. The evidence did not establish bullying, victimisation, inadequate supervision, improper treatment of special educational needs or racist conduct. Applying R v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728, the court found neither less favourable treatment nor treatment on racial grounds. The school had acted appropriately in treating the complaints as matters for its internal procedures rather than safeguarding referrals.
4. Causation. The claimed tutoring and related losses flowed from the defendants’ decision to withdraw the boys after reading the Hackney report, rather than from any breach by the school. That decision would in any event have been an intervening act.
5. Orders concerning reporting. The reporting restriction made under section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 was discharged. The boys’ Article 8 rights were engaged, but so were the media’s and public’s Article 10 rights. Following re S (a child) [2005] 1 AC 593, neither right had automatic precedence and proportionality had to be assessed in the circumstances. The court also noted JC & RT v Central Criminal Court [2014] EWHC 1041 concerning the duration of such protection.
6. Judgment was entered for the school on its claim and the counterclaim was dismissed. The defendants were ordered to pay the claim and counterclaim costs, with the specified Part 36 consequences. Permission to appeal was refused.