Ashraf v General Dental Council

An acquittal in criminal proceedings does not, by itself, make subsequent professional disciplinary proceedings an abuse of process. Criminal and disciplinary proceedings serve different purposes and may involve different evidence and standards of proof. An acquittal is a relevant factor, but the regulator must assess fairness in the particular circumstances and by reference to its regulatory objectives. Where a specialist tribunal has heard live evidence, an appellate court should be slow to interfere with primary factual findings unless they are shown with reasonable certainty to be wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Dishonest claims upon NHS funds and interference with a regulatory investigation may justify a finding of impairment and erasure where public confidence would otherwise be undermined.

A Professional Conduct Committee of the General Dental Council found that a dentist had made inappropriate and dishonest NHS claims, failed to submit forms enabling deductions from NHS payments, and interfered with witnesses. It found misconduct and impairment and ordered erasure from the register.

The dentist had previously been acquitted of related criminal charges of fraud and theft. The Committee refused to stay the disciplinary proceedings as an abuse of process. The appeal under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 challenged that decision, the factual findings, the impairment finding and the sanction. The central issues were whether the disciplinary proceedings were unfair after the acquittal and whether the Committee’s conclusions were wrong or unjust.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Committee’s decisions were neither procedurally unjust nor wrong within the meaning of CPR 52.11.
2. The fact of a criminal acquittal does not make it inherently abusive for a disciplinary tribunal to consider substantially the same subject matter. The double-jeopardy rule does not apply. Criminal proceedings principally impose sanctions for breaches of criminal law, whereas professional regulation protects the public and maintains professional standards and confidence. The evidence and applicable rules may also differ. The approach in R (Redgrave) v Commission of Police for the Metropolis, [2003] 1 WLR 1136, at paragraphs 37 and 38, was correct and was confirmed by the approach in Phillips v General Medical Council, [2004] EWHC 1858 (Admin), Sacha v General Medical Council, [2009] EWHC 302 (Admin), and Bhatt v General Medical Council, [2011] EWHC 783 (Admin).
3. There may nevertheless be circumstances in which proceeding after an acquittal is unfair. Regulators must consider the particular circumstances and their regulatory objectives. The former guidance commended in R (Redgrave) at paragraph 46 was guidance rather than law and did not establish that proceedings following an acquittal would normally be unfair.
4. The Committee had properly weighed the acquittal, the seriousness of the allegations, the public interest, the passage of time and the hardship to the dentist. Given the relevance of honesty in NHS funding claims to professional responsibilities, its refusal to stay the proceedings disclosed no error of law.
5. The appellate court should respect the specialist tribunal’s assessment of live evidence and should be cautious before differing from it, as explained in Biogen Inc v Medusa plc, [1997] RPC 1. The findings were supported by cogent evidence and were not perverse. The applicable question was whether the Committee’s decision was wrong, as described in Meadow v General Medical Council, [2006] EWCA Civ 1390.
6. The findings of dishonest NHS claims and interference with the investigation necessarily undermined the trust and confidence required of a dentist providing NHS services. The finding of impairment and the decision that erasure was proportionate were therefore unassailable.

The appeal was brought under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 from decisions of the General Dental Council’s Professional Conduct Committee dated 21 and 22 October 2013. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal.