Walker v The Secretary for State for Education

On an appeal from a professional disciplinary decision, the court applies the appeal threshold in CPR 52.11, rather than conducting a rehearing. Intervention is justified only where the decision is wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. A decision-maker may consider matters which a professional conduct panel omitted or treated differently, provided the relevant considerations were properly identified and the decision-maker acts within the broad discretionary ambit. Comparisons with sanctions in other disciplinary cases require caution because each case turns on its own facts. A panel’s recommendation does not fetter the final decision-maker’s power to impose a different sanction.

The appellant, a schoolteacher, had been convicted of dangerous driving, possessing a bladed article, criminal damage and a public order offence arising from an incident involving three boys. A professional conduct panel recommended a prohibition order with a two-year review period. The Secretary of State’s decision-maker imposed a prohibition order without any right of review.

The appellant accepted that prohibition was appropriate but challenged the absence of review. He alleged inconsistency with other disciplinary cases, procedural irregularity, improper consideration of threatening behaviour and professional reputation, and personal intervention by the Secretary of State motivated by political bias. The central issues were whether the decision was wrong or procedurally unjust and whether the decision-maker had exceeded his powers or discretion.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to establish that the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. He was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, subject to assessment if not agreed.
2. Under CPR 52.11, the appeal was not a rehearing. The court could intervene only if the statutory decision-maker’s decision crossed the applicable threshold. The Secretary of State had a wide discretionary ambit, and the decision would be wrong only if it fell outside that ambit.
3. The decision-maker was entitled to take account of the appellant’s threatening behaviour. The appellant accepted that his conduct could have been perceived as threatening, and no provision restricted the decision-maker to matters expressly relied on by the panel.
4. The decision-maker was also entitled to consider the effect of the conduct on the standing of the teaching profession. The disciplinary documentation had identified that matter as relevant, so the appellant was on notice of it. The decision-maker could give it such weight as appeared appropriate.
5. Comparisons with other teachers’ sanctions were treated with caution. In accordance with the observations in R (Henderson) v GTCE [2012] EWHC 1505 (Admin), disciplinary decisions turn on their own facts and do not operate as precedents. The cases relied on were materially different, and the statistical evidence did not establish undue harshness.
6. The panel’s recommendation for a two-year review did not fetter the decision-maker’s power to impose a prohibition without review. A purpose of the process was to allow the decision-maker to depart from the panel’s recommendation where appropriate.
7. The allegation of personal intervention by the Secretary of State rested on suspicion and innuendo. There was no credible evidence of intervention or political bias. The fact that the decision-maker imposed a harsher sanction than the panel did not itself support such an inference.

The appellant appealed to the High Court against the Secretary of State for Education’s decision dated 20 June 2013. The decision followed a professional conduct panel’s recommendation of a prohibition order with a two-year review period. The High Court dismissed the appeal.