Razoq, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

A representation by the State constrains a later reconsideration only where, viewed objectively and in its full context, it amounts to a clear and unequivocal promise, made to a person with an appropriate interest, on which that person reasonably relies. Withdrawal or quashing of an administrative decision generally leaves the decision-maker free to reconsider the matter on the basis of all material considerations prevailing at the time. A temporary reinstatement of refugee status, pending reconsideration, does not create an expectation that the original deception or other material underlying considerations will be excluded unless that restriction was clearly promised.

The claimant challenged the Secretary of State’s decision to cancel his refugee status after an earlier cancellation had been withdrawn and his status temporarily reinstated. The first judicial review proceedings were compromised by a consent order recording reinstatement and permitting withdrawal of the claim.

The claimant argued that the reinstatement created a legitimate expectation that his refugee status would not again be revoked on the same grounds, namely that deception had been decisive in the original grant of asylum. Permission was granted only on that ground. The central issue was whether the correspondence and related communications objectively amounted to a clear and unequivocal promise excluding that consideration from the reconsideration.

1. Claim dismissed. The Secretary of State’s later reconsideration was not unlawful on legitimate-expectation grounds.
2. Where an administrative decision is withdrawn or quashed, the decision-maker is generally free to reconsider and redetermine it in light of all material considerations prevailing when the new decision is made. That freedom may be constrained where the State makes a clear and unequivocal representation or promise, viewed in its full context, that it will not consider an otherwise material matter, and the person to whom it is made reasonably relies upon it.
3. The relevant context included the claimant’s solicitors’ correspondence. That correspondence sought reconsideration of whether his deception had been decisive in obtaining refugee status, sought reinstatement only pending the new decision, and expressly reserved the right to challenge a later decision reached on the same basis. It therefore contemplated that the deception would remain relevant to the reconsideration.
4. The Secretary of State’s letter agreeing to reinstate refugee status did not promise that the deception would be excluded. The claimant’s solicitors continued to act on the basis that the Secretary of State would reconsider the same material, and the claimant could not objectively disavow that correspondence.
5. The court accepted the Treasury Solicitor’s evidence about the telephone conversations. Those conversations concerned the withdrawal of the litigation and did not create a promise that the claimant’s immigration file would be permanently closed or that the deception would be disregarded.
6. The Secretary of State was therefore entitled to reconsider whether the deception was decisive under paragraph 339A(vii) of the Immigration Rules. The sole permitted ground of challenge failed.

The claim was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was initially refused on all grounds by His Honour Judge David Cook. On renewal, Andrews J refused permission on all grounds except the legitimate-expectation ground determined by Mr Justice Hickinbottom in this judgment.