Dogaev (aka Evgeny Rotshtein) v Czech Republic

Delay bars extradition only where it makes the proposed proceedings unjust or oppressive. The court must assess the whole course of events, including the requested person’s responsibility for delay, the requesting state’s conduct, the seriousness of the alleged offence, and the practical effect on the fairness of the trial or the person’s circumstances.

A court may proceed on the basis that a requesting state will comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention and the ECHR. Extradition does not create a real risk of indirect refoulement where the requesting state would not remove the person to a country presenting a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. Interference with family life caused by extradition may nevertheless be proportionate where extradition serves the legitimate aim of implementing extradition arrangements and the public interest is substantial.

The appellant challenged an order made by District Judge Evans on 24 April 2014 requiring his extradition to the Czech Republic under a European arrest warrant. The warrant concerned an alleged incident on an aircraft diverted to Prague in December 2006.

The appellant relied on the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the risk of onward removal to Russia contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, and the resulting impact on his family life. The district judge rejected those arguments. The central issues were whether extradition would now be unjust or oppressive, whether it created a real risk of indirect refoulement, and whether the interference with family life was disproportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The passage of time had not made extradition unjust under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The appellant would be entitled to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. He had long known the prosecution case and could seek to present evidence from his wife and friends. The possible absence of witnesses from the Czech Republic did not establish injustice.
2. Nor was extradition oppressive. The Czech authorities had begun proceedings promptly and had suspended them while the Russian extradition request was pursued. That course was understandable given the aircraft’s registration, the nationality or location of the crew, and the Tokyo Convention. The appellant had not claimed asylum in the Czech Republic before fleeing, and the unexplained periods before the domestic warrant and EAW were not sufficiently long, alone or cumulatively, to bar extradition.
3. The uncertainty whether time spent detained in the United Kingdom would be credited against a Czech sentence, and the prospect of hardship to the appellant and his family, did not make extradition oppressive. The seriousness of the alleged offence was a relevant factor, although it could not outweigh a proper finding of likely injustice.
4. There was no real risk of indirect refoulement. The court proceeded on the basis that the Czech Republic would comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention and the ECHR and would not deport the appellant to Russia where there was a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. Budrevich v the Czech Republic App no. 65303/10 concerned a different procedural defect and did not establish a systemic failing in Czech procedures.
5. Extradition would interfere with the appellant’s private and family life, but the interference was proportionate under Article 8. Implementing extradition arrangements pursued a legitimate aim, the alleged offence was serious, and the appellant’s wife could care for their children during the separation.

The appeal was brought under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Evans’s order of 24 April 2014 requiring extradition to the Czech Republic. The High Court dismissed the appeal.