QRS v Beach & Anor

Interim injunctive relief under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may restrain repeated online publication where the material is targeted, objectively alarming or distressing, and oppressive and unacceptable in its social or working context. Ongoing publication on a prominent website may constitute conduct on more than two occasions. Where the injunction affects freedom of expression, the court must apply the threshold in section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998: the applicant must be likely to establish at trial that publication should not be allowed. A representative claimant may sue for persons sharing the same interest, but the represented class must be sufficiently identifiable.

The claimant, a solicitor and chairman of a firm, applied for interim injunctions against a former client and the operator of a website. The application alleged that repeated online postings, caricatures and allegations concerning the claimant and other lawyers amounted to harassment. The claimant also sought relief in a representative capacity under CPR 19.6.

The second defendant was not properly served and the substantive application against him did not proceed. The first defendant was properly served but did not attend. The court therefore considered the representative status of the claimant, the procedural basis for proceeding in the first defendant’s absence, and whether the evidence satisfied the statutory and Convention requirements for interim relief.

1. The court proceeded against the first defendant in his absence under CPR 23.11(1), having found service effective under CPR 6.26, CPR 23.7 and CPR 7.5. The application against the second defendant was not heard without notice because service had not been effected in accordance with the CPR.

2. The claimant could continue the proceedings representatively under CPR 19.6 for individuals in the firm who were named on, or at risk from, the websites, and for persons acting for the claimant in the proceedings. The proposed class of future employees was insufficiently identifiable. No determination was made about continuing the proceedings against the second defendant representatively.

3. Because the relief affected freedom of expression, section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 applied. Following Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253, the usual threshold was whether the claimant was likely to succeed at trial, generally meaning more likely than not. That threshold was satisfied.

4. The court applied the harassment principles summarised in AVB v TDD [2014] EWHC 1442 (QB), derived in part from Dowson v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB) and Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224. The conduct had occurred on repeated occasions, was targeted at the claimant and others, was objectively calculated to cause alarm or distress, and crossed the line from unattractive and unreasonable conduct into oppressive and unacceptable conduct amounting to torment.

   Ongoing publication on prominent websites could cause continuing distress and satisfy the requirement for conduct on at least two occasions. The evidence supported the inference that the first defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the conduct amounted to harassment. No defence under section 1(3) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 appeared available.

5. Delay did not justify refusing relief. The evidence established continuing distress, and the delay had caused no apparent prejudice or weakened the claim. Interim injunctive relief was granted in the terms of the order drawn up on 14 August 2014.