Randall v Randall

A claimant challenging the validity of a will must demonstrate a substantive common-law interest in the estate. The requirement is mandatory and cannot be abolished or broadened merely because the will is alleged to be forged or has become a public document. The broad approach to standing in judicial review does not apply to contentious probate claims, which concern private rights.

The relevant interest is assessed by reference to personal representation, the grant of representation, and entitlement to distribution from the estate. A creditor of a beneficiary has only a personal or contingent debt claim against that beneficiary. That is not an interest in the estate sufficient to confer probate standing.

The claimant, the former husband of the defendant, sought pronouncement against the deceased’s will and revocation of the grant of probate. He relied on a consent order made in earlier matrimonial proceedings, under which he would receive half of any inheritance received by the defendant from her mother above £100,000.

The parties agreed that the preliminary issue would be determined on the footing that the facts pleaded by the claimant were true. The central questions were whether an interest in the estate was a procedural or substantive requirement, what rights the consent order created, and whether those rights gave the claimant standing to bring a contentious probate claim.

1. Preliminary issue answered in the negative. The claimant did not have an interest in the estate sufficient to give him standing to challenge the will.
2. The requirement to show an interest in the estate is a mandatory substantive requirement of the common law. CPR 57.7 provides the procedural machinery for identifying that interest; it does not redefine or abolish the substantive gateway.
3. The broad and elastic concept of sufficient interest in judicial review cannot be transplanted into probate proceedings. Judicial review protects the public against unlawful executive action, whereas probate claims concern private rights between citizens. The public availability of a proved will does not give every member of the public standing to challenge it.
4. The consent order created personal obligations on the defendant. Those obligations arose only when she received the relevant gift or inheritance. The claimant therefore had, at most, a contingent or accrued debt claim against the defendant personally. He had no proprietary interest in the deceased’s assets while they remained in the estate.
5. An interest in the estate is determined by the touchstones of personal representation, the grant of representation, and entitlement to distribution of the estate. A creditor of a beneficiary is not within those categories.
6. It was unnecessary to widen the gateway. The court’s supervisory jurisdiction and the safeguards in section 121 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provide mechanisms for intervention where there is a real risk of injustice.