Bizunowicz & Anor v District Court in Koszalin (Poland) & Anor

In extradition proceedings, the public interest in giving effect to a European Arrest Warrant is very substantial, but its weight varies with the nature and seriousness of the offences. Article 8 rights may prevail where the interference is exceptionally serious and the offence, delay, personal circumstances and time already spent subject to restrictions make extradition disproportionate.

The High Court has no statutory jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a costs order made under section 60(1) of the Extradition Act 2003. Such a challenge ordinarily requires judicial review. Where an extradition appeal succeeds and the extradition order is quashed, however, the costs order founded on that order must also be quashed as a necessary consequence.

Two appeals concerned extradition under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003. One appellant challenged surrender to Poland for historic criminal-damage offences and relied on delay and his established private and family life in the United Kingdom. The other challenged surrender to the Czech Republic to serve a sentence for fraud, relying principally on delay under section 14 and Article 8.

Both appellants also challenged costs orders made by District Judges under section 60(1). The common procedural issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to vary or quash such an order, either on an unsuccessful substantive appeal or after a successful appeal against extradition.

1. Mr Bizunowicz’s substantive appeal. The court allowed the appeal and quashed the extradition order. Although the public interest in extradition carries very great weight, Norris v Government of the USA [2010] 2 AC 487 and H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic [2013] 1 AC 338 required the court to assess the weight of that interest by reference to the nature and seriousness of the offences. The relevant factors included the appellant’s established private and family life, the age and comparatively trivial nature of the offences, the substantial delay, the absence of an explanation for part of that delay, the availability of compensation, and time already spent serving the sentence or under an electronically monitored curfew. In combination, those matters made surrender a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights.
2. Mr Florea’s substantive appeal. The appeal was dismissed. The offences were serious, involved an international criminal gang and credit-card fraud, and the court accepted that there had been no culpable delay by the Czech authorities. The Article 8 circumstances were not sufficiently exceptional to outweigh the public interest in extradition.
3. Costs jurisdiction. Sections 26 and 27 of the Extradition Act 2003 concern appeals against extradition orders, not costs orders. Section 34 does not create a statutory appeal where the Act provides none. Section 60(3) permits the appellate court to make a costs order when dismissing a substantive appeal, but does not confer an indirect jurisdiction to vary or quash the District Judge’s earlier costs order. The court therefore declined to follow Skraba v Regional Court in Nowy Sacz, Poland [2014] EWHC 2193 (Admin) on that point. Judicial review remains available.
4. Successful appeal. Where the High Court allows an extradition appeal and quashes the extradition order under section 27(5), the basis for a section 60(1) costs order disappears. A power to quash that costs order is necessarily implied. The court accordingly quashed Mr Bizunowicz’s costs order and ordered payment of his successful appeal costs from central funds under section 61.

The judgment does not state a separate appellate history beyond the appeals from orders made by District Judges in the Magistrates’ Court.