BC, R (on the application of) v North Yorkshire County Council & Anor

Subordinate legislation must be interpreted consistently with its enabling Act and cannot override or contradict primary legislation. A statutory definition applying specifically to one admission-coordination provision does not necessarily govern other admission arrangements. In the absence of a statutory requirement, an admission authority may lawfully use the September-to-August school-year period to identify a child’s normal chronological age group. That approach does not create a legitimate expectation that the August-to-July academic-year definition will be used, and is not irrational merely because a different statutory definition exists for a limited purpose.

BC, aged four, sought judicial review of North Yorkshire County Council’s decision to admit him to reception in the 2014/15 academic year on the basis that he was outside his chronological age group. His parents preferred reception placement, but challenged the use of the September-to-August school-year period rather than the August-to-July definition of academic year in the School Standards and Framework Act 1998.

The claim was heard as a rolled-up hearing after permission had been granted. The issues were whether the admission arrangements were unlawful, irrational, or contrary to a legitimate expectation.

1. Permission and justiciability. Permission was granted because it was reasonably arguable that the Council’s approach to BC’s chronological age group had legal consequences, notwithstanding that he would be placed in reception.
2. Meaning and scope of “academic year”. Section 88M(5) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 defines “academic year” as 1 August to 31 July, but that definition is confined to the co-ordination of admission arrangements under section 88M. It is not of general application to all admission arrangements.
3. Relationship between primary and subordinate legislation. The School Admissions (Admission Arrangements Co-ordination of Admission Arrangements) (England) Regulations 2012 had to be read consistently with the primary legislation. Their repeated use of “academic year” could not require an interpretation inconsistent with section 579 of the Education Act 1996 and the wider scheme of the 1998 Act. The court applied the principle stated in R v Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and R v Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte B [1996] 4 All ER 385.
4. Lawfulness of the Council’s approach. The Council had no statutory obligation to use the August-to-July period for identifying the normal chronological age group. Use of the September-to-August period was lawful, reasonable and consistent with ordinary admission practice. There was no legitimate expectation that the August-to-July definition would be used, and no irrationality.
5. The application was refused. The court also refused leave to appeal.