V v T & Anor

Applications under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 are subject to the fundamental principle of open justice. The private and family character of trust arrangements, confidentiality, wealth, or the parties’ consent does not by itself justify a private hearing.

A departure from open justice requires exceptional circumstances, established by clear and cogent evidence, and must be strictly necessary for the proper administration of justice. Where children’s welfare is at risk from publicity, proportionate reporting restrictions and anonymisation may suffice. The court should impose no greater restriction than is necessary.

The claimant, a settlor, sought approval under section 1 of the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 for arrangements varying three similar trusts. The substantive arrangements were approved. The remaining issue concerned whether the related applications should be heard in private, given the value of the trust assets, confidential commercial information, and the interests and welfare of minor and unborn beneficiaries.

The parties relied on CPR rule 39.2(3), particularly provisions concerning confidential information, children, and trust administration. The central issue was whether the circumstances justified departing from the general rule that hearings are conducted in public, or whether less restrictive reporting measures were sufficient.

1. Private hearing refused. The general rule under CPR rule 39.2(1) is that hearings are in public. That rule applies to applications under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958. The open justice principle protects public attendance and media reporting, supports confidence in the administration of justice, and serves the public interest in knowing how courts operate (paras [12]–[20]).
2. Derogation from open justice is justified only in exceptional circumstances and where strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. The burden lies on the party seeking the derogation, who must produce clear and cogent evidence. Privacy or confidentiality alone is insufficient (paras [13]–[14], [19]–[20]).
3. The evidence concerning possible commercial harm from disclosure of company profits and risks to the beneficiaries’ personal security was too weak to meet that standard (paras [21]–[22]).
4. The evidence concerning the children was materially stronger. Publicity about their potential wealth could adversely affect their upbringing, personal development, education, sense of entitlement, and relationships. The court was therefore entitled to take protective steps (paras [23]–[24]).
5. Those steps had to be proportionate. Reporting restrictions and an anonymised judgment were sufficient to protect the children. It was unnecessary to exclude the public from the hearing altogether (paras [25]–[27]). The court therefore directed that the cases be heard in open court, while imposing reporting restrictions and ordering restrictions on non-parties’ access to documents and transcripts (paras [28]–[29]).
6. The court also gave guidance for future listing. Where parties genuinely intend to seek privacy, reporting restrictions, or anonymisation at the substantive hearing, Chancery Listing may list the case using random initials, but that procedure must not be abused (para [30]).

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.