Cornick, R. v

A defendant’s age does not by itself justify continuing anonymity under section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. The applicant must establish a good reason, including a real and immediate risk to life under Article 2 or welfare considerations under Article 8. Those interests must be balanced against the Article 10 rights of the press and public and the strong principle of open justice. After conviction and sentence for a serious offence, the public interest in knowing the defendant’s identity may carry particular weight. The court may also consider deterrence and the public importance of informed debate, but the effect of identification on the defendant’s family is not a relevant consideration under section 39.

William Cornick, aged 15 years and 10 months when he murdered his teacher, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure, with a minimum term of 20 years. A reporting restriction had previously been made under section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. After sentence, the defence sought its continuation. The media, led by The Guardian, opposed the application.

The court considered whether identification created a real and immediate risk to the defendant’s life under Article 2. If not, it had to balance his welfare under section 44 and Article 8 against the Article 10 rights of the press and public. The application concerned the defendant only; anonymity orders concerning other children involved in the case remained in force.

1. The application to continue the section 39 order was refused. The order was lifted in respect of the defendant, although it remained in force for the other children named in its Schedule.
2. Article 2 was not engaged. The evidence of a possible increased risk of attack by fellow inmates was too vague and unsupported by evidence of a specific increased risk. The risk of suicide could not be higher as a consequence of identification because the defendant was already subject to permanent 24-hour suicide watch. These potential risks remained relevant to welfare under the Article 8 balancing exercise.
3. Section 39 required a good reason for anonymity. The fact that the defendant was under 18 was insufficient by itself. The court applied the balancing principles identified in R v Winchester Crown Court [2000] 1 Crim. App R 11 and restated in R (Y) v Aylesbury Crown Court and Others [2012] EWHC 1140 (Admin).
4. The evidence that identification might hinder rehabilitation was a relevant factor, but it was general and largely asserted. Section 39 was not expressly directed to rehabilitation. The defendant’s rehabilitation also depended on his own acceptance of responsibility, and the effect of identification on his family was irrelevant to the section 39 balancing exercise.
5. Against those considerations stood the strong public interest in open justice, the ordinary expectation that convicted defendants would be identified, the exceptional public interest in the case, the value of informed public debate about school safety and related issues, and deterrence. The Article 10 rights of the press and public outweighed the defendant’s Article 8 rights.

Not stated in the judgment. This was a first-instance application in the High Court concerning continuation of a reporting restriction after conviction and sentence.