Hettiarachchi, R (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Naturalisation requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant is of good character. The British Nationality Act 1981 contains no exhaustive definition of good character, leaving the issue to judgment and evaluation. Deliberate deception in a current or previous immigration application may justify refusal, even where the deception was immaterial to the earlier application. The court’s role is limited to reviewing whether the Secretary of State’s approach was rational and reasonably open to her. Where material inconsistencies and established lies reasonably support a finding of deception, refusal of naturalisation is lawful.

The claimant and her husband applied for naturalisation as British citizens, with their dependent son included in the family application. The Secretary of State refused the applications on the ground that the claimant had failed to satisfy the good-character requirement because of deception in earlier immigration proceedings and inconsistencies during the naturalisation interview.

The claimant sought judicial review of the refusal dated 13 June 2013. Permission was granted on 17 February 2014. The central issue was whether the Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the claimant had not discharged the burden of showing that she was of good character.

1. The applications for judicial review were dismissed. The Secretary of State was entitled to refuse naturalisation to the claimant and, consequently, to refuse the linked applications of her husband and son.

2. Under section 6(1) and Schedule 1(1)(b) of the British Nationality Act 1981, naturalisation is discretionary and depends on the Secretary of State being satisfied that the applicant fulfils the statutory requirements, including good character. The Act provides no statutory definition of good character. It is an evaluative judgment, and the applicant bears the burden of satisfying the Secretary of State on the balance of probabilities.

3. The court should not discourage the Secretary of State from adopting a high standard in matters entrusted to her judgment, provided that the standard is reasonably capable of adoption in the circumstances. The relevant question on judicial review was whether the conclusion fell outside the bounds of rationality.

4. The Secretary of State was entitled to take account of deception in previous immigration proceedings, even where the deception was not material to the earlier claim. The guidance expressly treated deception in a current or previous application as sufficient to warrant refusal on good-character grounds.

5. The Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the claimant’s admitted deliberate lies concerning her husband’s whereabouts, the finding of deception in her husband’s appeal, and serious inconsistencies concerning her operational role and her knowledge of General Ratwatte’s alleged criminal charges. Although two other alleged contradictions were weak, the remaining findings were sufficient. It was rational to conclude that the claimant had not shown herself to be of good character.

6. The distinction between asylum and naturalisation was material. The tests and burdens in the two contexts differ, so a conclusion in one context does not bind the decision-maker in the other.

The Secretary of State was awarded costs assessed at £1,720.

The judgment describes a first-instance judicial review claim commenced on 13 September 2013. Permission was granted by a single judge on 17 February 2014. The Administrative Court dismissed all three applications.