Magee v Crown Prosecution Service

Under section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, the duty to stop, provide particulars or report an accident is not strict liability. The defendant may show that she genuinely lacked knowledge or belief that an accident occurred, although the burden lies on her. Immediate notification will ordinarily support an inference of awareness. The defence is unavailable where the lack of awareness or belief results from voluntary intoxication.

The appellant appealed by way of case stated from the Bromley Magistrates’ Court. She had reversed into another vehicle, left without providing her details or reporting the accident, and was prosecuted under section 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. She maintained that she genuinely did not believe an accident had occurred, but that belief was attributed to intoxication.

The Divisional Court considered whether notification of an alleged accident amounted to awareness of the accident, whether the defence recognised in Harding v Price applied, and whether intoxication affected that defence.

1. Appeal dismissed; conviction upheld.
2. Section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is not a strict-liability provision. Following Harding v Price [1948] 1 AER 283, a defendant may establish that she was genuinely unaware that an accident occurred or genuinely did not believe that it occurred. The burden lies on the defendant.
3. Knowledge of an allegation and knowledge that an accident occurred are conceptually distinct. However, a court may infer awareness from notification immediately or shortly after the event. Only in an exceptional case, such as a genuine belief that the allegation is false, will the duty not arise.
4. The duty depends on the defendant’s genuine belief, not the reasonableness of the request for information.
5. Voluntary intoxication could not be relied on as the cause of the appellant’s lack of awareness or belief. The court applied the basic-intent principle in DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 447.
6. Jaggard v Dickinson [1980] 3 All ER 716 was confined to the construction of a specific statutory defence under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. It did not govern the common-law defence arising under section 170. The court also noted doubt about its continuing correctness in light of O'Connor [1991] CLR 135 and R v Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951.
7. Even if the appellant genuinely remained unaware because of drunkenness, she could not rely on that fact. The conviction therefore stood regardless of the precise finding about her belief after being told of the collision.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The Divisional Court determined an appeal by way of case stated from the Bromley Magistrates’ Court and upheld the conviction.