Speers v The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

An application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is determined on traditional judicial review grounds. The weight given to material planning considerations is a matter for the decision-maker, subject to statutory limits and irrationality. An inspector’s decision letter must be read fairly, as a whole and in a practical manner. The inspector must address the main controversial issues, but need not deal separately with every argument or material consideration. Reasons are sufficient if they enable the parties to understand how the relevant issues were resolved, and a reasons challenge requires substantial prejudice. A finding that activity will not materially increase is an evaluative planning judgment. A mistake of fact or unavailable evidence only constitutes an error of law where it was established, not attributable to the claimant, and materially affected the reasoning.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s decision allowing an appeal under section 78 and granting permission for an extension to a motor repair garage and retrospective rear parking at Upton upon Severn.

The claimant challenged the decision on irrationality, inadequate reasons for a planning condition, and procedural unfairness arising from the Council’s failure to send the inspector an earlier noise complaint. The central issues were whether the inspector had lawfully assessed noise and disturbance, whether her reasons and conditions were adequate, and whether the missing evidence was material.

1. The application was dismissed. The inspector’s decision was not vitiated by irrationality, inadequate reasons or procedural unfairness.
2. Planning decision-makers must take account of material considerations, including relevant national and local policies. The weight given to those considerations is a matter of planning judgment, subject to statutory limits and the ordinary irrationality standard. The court should be particularly cautious before interfering with an inspector’s evaluative judgment.
3. The inspector was entitled to conclude that the proposed rear access and increased workshop space would not produce a material increase in activity, noise or disturbance. She had addressed the proposed relocation of access to the rear and was entitled to reach that conclusion on the evidence and her site visit.
4. A decision letter must be read fairly and as a whole. It need only address the main issues in dispute. The reasons for excluding additional openings were sufficiently clear when the decision was read with the Council’s proposed condition and the inspector’s reasoning that cavity walling and restrictions on openings were required to protect neighbouring living conditions. No substantial prejudice was established.
5. Under article 31(1)(a)(iii) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010, reasons for conditions must be stated clearly and precisely. The requirement was satisfied in substance.
6. The Council’s failure to forward the claimant’s email amounted to an arguable procedural defect because the email was a representation. However, the omission was immaterial. The inspector was concerned with the additional noise and disturbance from the proposed development, not the lawfully existing level of noise. The evidence would not or could not materially have altered her conclusion.

This was a first-instance application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The court dismissed the application and left the inspector’s decision granting planning permission in force.