Brit College v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Judicial review of a sponsor-licence revocation is supervisory. The court does not remake the Secretary of State’s decision, provided the decision falls within the range of rational and reasonable responses to the evidence.

In assessing whether revocation is lawful, individual concerns may be considered cumulatively. Relevant matters included unreliable attendance records, poor student attendance, inadequate assessment of students before issuing confirmations of acceptance, failures concerning approved qualifications, and absent English-language verification evidence. Later evidence does not necessarily undermine the original decision, particularly where it was available earlier, leaves material questions unanswered, or is inconsistent with previous representations. A discretionary power need not be expressly rehearsed in the decision letter where the decision-maker was aware of the available options and the decision was otherwise rational.

Brit College sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision of 21 May 2014 to revoke its licence as a sponsor of non-EEA students under the points-based immigration system. The revocation followed an inspection and consideration of the College’s written representations.

The College challenged the rationality and reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s reliance on five areas of concern, including attendance monitoring, student attendance, student assessments, qualifications and English-language verification. It also argued that later evidence supplied with its pre-action protocol letter required the decision to be reconsidered, that the discretionary nature of the revocation power had not been addressed, and that reliance on new material was procedurally unfair.

The central issues were whether the revocation decision was irrational or unreasonable and whether it remained lawful when considered in light of the later material.

1. Permission and claim. The court refused permission to apply for judicial review. The Secretary of State’s decision to revoke the sponsor licence fell comfortably within the limits open to her in exercising judgment and discretion.
2. Supervisory approach. The court adopted the principles stated in R (The London Reading College) v SSHD, [2010] EWHC 2561 (Admin). The primary judgment on the response to breaches of sponsor duties belonged to the Secretary of State. The court’s role was supervisory. The importance of maintaining immigration control justified a high index of suspicion and a relatively low threshold for intervention.
3. Attendance and student compliance. The College’s attendance system permitted retrospective amendments and did not provide a proper basis for fulfilling its sponsorship duties. The poor attendance of many students, the absence of warning letters, and the College’s inconsistent explanations were relevant considerations. Attendance could properly be assessed over the period under review rather than only at the end of a semester.
4. Other compliance failures. The Secretary of State was entitled to find breaches concerning CAS assessments and changes of course. The failure to provide timely evidence concerning IAM students supplied an alternative basis for maintaining revocation under the relevant guidance. The absence of evidence verifying English-language qualifications could also be taken into account cumulatively, although that issue alone might not have justified revocation.
5. Later evidence and discretion. The later material did not require the Secretary of State to change her decision. It was largely available earlier, left significant matters unexplained, and did not undermine the original conclusions. The court rejected the argument that the Secretary of State had failed to exercise discretion merely because the decision letter did not expressly rehearse the available alternatives.
6. Procedural fairness and Convention claim. It was unnecessary to determine the alleged procedural unfairness concerning material about one student, since it could not affect the decision on the issue. A claim for damages under Article 1 of the First Protocol did not arise. The claim was not arguable and permission was refused.