Warwickshire Police v Young

In civil proceedings under the Dogs Act 1871, costs are governed by the statutory discretion to make an order that is just and reasonable. Where a public authority exercises a regulatory function, there is no presumption that costs follow the event. Costs may nevertheless be ordered where the authority acted unreasonably in commencing or pursuing the complaint. The court must balance the public interest in permitting authorities to make and stand by reasonable decisions against the defendant’s financial prejudice. A complaint may be treated as not proceeded with according to substance, even without a formally effective discontinuance. Costs under the statutory scheme are not subject to ordinary civil or criminal costs assessment procedures; the magistrates must determine a just and reasonable sum.

The Chief Constable appealed by way of case stated from the Warwickshire Magistrates’ Court’s order requiring payment of £5,000 costs to the respondent in civil proceedings under section 2 of the Dogs Act 1871. The complaint alleged that the respondent’s dog was dangerous and not kept under proper control. The Crown Prosecution Service, acting for the police, later indicated that the proceedings would not be pursued. The magistrates awarded costs under section 52 of the Courts Act 1971. The appeal challenged the statutory basis for the order, the identity of the complainant, the attribution of the CPS’s conduct to the police, and the amount awarded.

1. The appeal was refused. The magistrates were entitled to order the Chief Constable to pay £5,000.

2. Section 52 of the Courts Act 1971 applies where a complaint is not proceeded with. It does not require a formally effective discontinuance. The CPS letter, properly construed, indicated that the complaint would not be pursued. In any event, dismissal would have engaged section 64 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, applying the same costs criteria.

3. The police were properly treated as the complainant. The complaint was made and pursued by the police in the public interest, although the original information came from the person affected. The statutory assignment to the DPP also showed that the CPS conducted proceedings brought by or on behalf of the police.

4. The principles in Bradford Metropolitan District Council v Booth (2000) 164 JP 485 and R (Perinpanathan) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWCA Civ 40 applied. There was no presumption that a public authority exercising regulatory functions should pay costs. However, a costs order could be made where the authority acted dishonestly or unreasonably. The magistrates were entitled to find that the police lacked sufficient evidence linking the respondent to the offending dog and had unreasonably pursued the complaint.

5. The CPS was acting as the police’s effective agent. The police were therefore responsible for unreasonable conduct by the CPS in conducting the complaint on their behalf.

6. The amount awarded was lawful. Costs under section 52 or section 64 were not subject to assessment under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Part 44 or criminal costs procedures. The magistrates had to assess what sum was just and reasonable. Their decision to award £5,000 was not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On appeal by way of case stated from the Warwickshire Magistrates’ Court, the appeal was refused and the magistrates’ answers were upheld.
• Warwickshire Magistrates’ Court: Ordered the Chief Constable to pay the respondent £5,000 costs under section 52 of the Courts Act 1971.