Ansar v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A legitimate expectation requires a public authority to have made a clear and unequivocal promise or adopted a sufficiently definite practice. Conditional language indicating an intention to endeavour to respond within a target period does not ordinarily create such an expectation. A reference to discussing an extension does not convert a conditional timetable into a binding promise. Nor does correspondence promising to consider material necessarily commit the authority to undertake a full review or make a fresh decision. Judicial review remains a remedy of last resort, and a claimant should ordinarily challenge the original decision or a refusal to reconsider it. Reliance causing detriment is also relevant where detriment is relied upon as an element of the claim.

The claimant sought mandatory orders requiring the Secretary of State to explain delay, act without further delay and accept purported evidence of his paternity of a child in the context of an Article 8 claim. The Secretary of State had previously refused the claimant’s application for leave to remain and had later declined to reconsider it.

The claim principally relied on a letter stating that the Secretary of State would endeavour to issue a response within 14 days and would contact the claimant if unable to meet that timetable. No response or extension discussion followed. The central issue was whether the letter created a legitimate expectation requiring a response or full review.

1. Claim dismissed. The letter was not a clear and unequivocal statement capable of founding a legitimate expectation. The expression that the Secretary of State would endeavour to respond within 14 days was conditional and contemplated that the target might not be achieved. The proposed contact to discuss an extension did not alter that essential character.
2. The letter did not promise that a full review would necessarily take place. It indicated only that the material supplied would be considered and left the Secretary of State entitled to take whatever reasonable action was appropriate. It did not impose an obligation to make a fresh decision, particularly where the original decision had already been reconsidered.
3. The principle that public authorities should honour promises or practices unless departure is legally required or proportionate, discussed in R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363, did not assist the claimant because no qualifying promise had been made.
4. The alleged delay was regrettable, but the claimant had not established reliance on the letter causing detriment. The asserted impact on his relationship with the child did not amount to detriment caused by reliance on the letter.
5. The claimant should instead have challenged the original decision or the refusal to alter it. Judicial review was a remedy of last resort, and a fresh claim remained available. The claim was refused and dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s summarily assessed costs of £4,474.