Haddock, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board of England & Wales & Anor

For a prisoner serving imprisonment for public protection, release is permissible only where the Parole Board is satisfied that detention is no longer necessary for public protection. The operative question is whether release would create a more than minimal risk to life or limb. The Board must assess the whole evidential picture, including progress in custody, continuing risk assessments, misconduct, lack of insight and the possibility of setbacks after release. Its evaluation is entrusted to its expertise and will not be replaced on judicial review unless irrational or wholly unreasonable. A review period may properly allow time for observation, assessment, reports and preparation, even where a shorter period would appear reasonable to the prisoner.

The claimant, serving an imprisonment for public protection sentence, challenged two decisions: the Parole Board’s refusal to direct his release and the Secretary of State’s refusal to reduce his review period from 12 months to eight months. He argued that his progress in open conditions, successful temporary releases and abstinence from drugs and alcohol outweighed criticisms of his conduct and association with a former co-defendant.

The central issues were whether the Board’s assessment of continuing risk was irrational or unfair, and whether the 12-month review period was unlawful.

1. The judicial review claim failed. Neither challenged decision was irrational or unlawful, and the application was refused.
2. Under section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Board had to decide whether it was satisfied that continued detention was no longer necessary for public protection. Applying R v the Parole Board ex parte Bradley [1991] 1 WLR 134, as affirmed in R (Sturnham) v the Parole Board No. 2 [2013] UKSC 47, the relevant question was whether release presented a more than minimal risk to life or limb.
3. The Board was entitled to consider the claimant’s progress alongside his medium risk assessment, repeated misconduct, poor consequential thinking, lack of insight and association with a former co-defendant. Individual incidents could be minor yet materially significant when considered collectively and against the risk of aggression resurfacing after setbacks or opposition.
4. The court could not substitute its own assessment of the competing considerations. The Board was a specialist body, and its decision fell within the range of decisions reasonably open to it.
5. The Secretary of State was also entitled to retain a 12-month review period. The period needed to provide sufficient time for observation, assessment, preparation and disclosure of reports. The fact that eight months might have been reasonable did not make 12 months irrational.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment does not state any prior appellate decision in this litigation.