Igbinovia v President of the Criminal Division (Seccion Segunda De La Audencia Provincial De Santa Cruz De Tenerife)

On an extradition appeal, an adjournment for proposed expert evidence should be refused where the evidence is speculative, irrelevant, unavailable through reasonable preparation, or unlikely to affect the result. Allegations of abuse of process must be particularised and directed to the requesting authority’s pursuit of extradition. The court must then consider capability, reasonable grounds, and whether abuse is established. The non-punishment provisions for trafficking victims do not confer immunity from prosecution or punishment. Article 8 requires a proportionality assessment between family-life interference and the public interest in extradition. There is no requirement of exceptional circumstances, but severe personal consequences may still be insufficient to outweigh extradition’s substantial public interest.

The appellant appealed against District Judge Snow’s order for his extradition to Spain to serve the balance of a sentence for cocaine importation. He argued that the District Judge had denied him a fair opportunity to present evidence by refusing an adjournment and that extradition would constitute an abuse of process because he claimed to have been trafficked into committing the offence. He also relied on Articles 4 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The High Court considered the proposed expert evidence, the trafficking-related obligations of the United Kingdom and Spain, abuse of process, and the proportionality of extradition in light of the appellant’s family circumstances.

1. Adjournment and further evidence. The proposed trafficking, Spanish-law, child-psychology and social-work evidence was either irrelevant, speculative, or insufficiently identified. The court was entitled to refuse an adjournment where the evidence was not shown to have been unavailable with due diligence and there was no proper basis for concluding that it would lead to discharge. The extradition process was intended to operate promptly and summarily. The first ground of appeal failed.
2. Abuse of process. The relevant principles were that allegations must be stated with particularity and relate to the prosecuting authority’s pursuit of extradition. The court must ask whether the alleged conduct was capable of amounting to abuse, whether there were reasonable grounds to believe it occurred, and, if so, whether abuse had been established. On the facts found, the alleged failure to consider trafficking or the non-punishment provisions did not satisfy that test.
3. Trafficking obligations. Article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking of Human Beings and Article 8 of the EU Directive on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims did not provide immunity from prosecution or punishment. The possibility that Spanish authorities had not considered the trafficking issue did not make extradition an abuse of process. The Convention and Directive obligations did not take precedence over the obligations arising under the European Framework Decision.
4. Article 8. Extradition necessarily interfered with the appellant’s private and family life and that of his family. The correct question was proportionality. There was no test of exceptionality. Although the consequences for the family were severe, they were not exceptionally severe, and did not outweigh the substantial public interest in extradition. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant’s costs were subject to detailed assessment.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: Following the European arrest warrant, District Judge Snow ordered extradition under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, with surrender deferred for ten days after the conclusive trafficking decision.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was dismissed. The court refused the application for an adjournment and rejected the abuse-of-process and human-rights arguments.