Director of Public Prosecutions v Richardson

Decisions whether to adjourn criminal proceedings remain matters for the trial court’s discretion. The court must assess the circumstances as a whole, including the age and history of the case, previous adjournments, responsibility for the delay, the likely length of any further adjournment, its effect on evidence and fairness, and the public interest in a trial. No single factor automatically prevails, including a failure by the court or the absence of fault by the parties. An appellate court should intervene only on clear grounds and should not substitute its own assessment of weight for that of the trial court.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated against the Norfolk Justices’ refusal to adjourn a prosecution for assault by beating contrary to Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 39. The trial had previously been ineffective on three occasions. The fourth hearing could not proceed because the proposed video link required a bridging link which had not been arranged. The prosecution argued that the failure was the court’s fault and that an earlier hearing should have been sought. The defendant relied on the age of the case and the loss of a defence witness. The central issue was whether the justices had considered all relevant factors and exercised their discretion lawfully.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The only question requiring an answer was whether the justices had considered all relevant factors. The answer was yes.

2. A decision whether to adjourn is particularly a matter for the trial court. An appellate court should intervene only where clear grounds are shown. The court must do justice between the parties in the circumstances as they have arisen.

3. The justices were entitled to consider the age of the case, the nature of the allegation and defence, the previous ineffective hearings, the responsibility for the latest failure, the likely further delay, the effect of delay on the quality of evidence and trial fairness, and the interests of the defendant, complainant and public. The absence of fault by the prosecution did not make an adjournment mandatory, particularly since the defendant was also without fault.

4. The justices had discovered that the earliest identified listing was ten weeks later. Their failure to investigate whether another case could be removed from the list was not material to the proper exercise of their discretion. The overall delay remained a relevant consideration.

5. The justices’ concern that further delay could adversely affect recollection and fairness was relevant. Their decision represented an assessment of weight between relevant considerations, rather than an error of law or an unfair exercise of discretion. Where no party is at fault, the answer depends on the facts of the particular case.

High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by way of case stated from the Norfolk County Justices’ refusal to adjourn dismissed.