Letherbarrow v Warwickshire County Council

For prosecutions under section 31(1)(b) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, time runs from the date when evidence which the prosecutor considers sufficient to justify proceedings comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge. The relevant prosecutor is the public body as a whole, but the relevant state of mind is that of the individual authorised to decide whether to prosecute. The test is not whether investigations have concluded. A certificate under section 31(2) may be issued after a time-limit challenge and is not essential if the prosecution proves the relevant date by evidence. A defendant’s response may be material to the decision whether prosecution is justified.

The claimant appealed by way of case stated against convictions by Warwickshire Justices for offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. He argued that informations concerning eight charges were out of time under section 31(1), and challenged the timing and evidential effect of a certificate issued under section 31(2).

The investigation concerned animal husbandry practices at the claimant’s farm. The prosecution authority received the claimant’s written responses on 14 June 2013. Janet Faulkner, the authorised Group Manager, decided on 5 August 2013 that prosecution should proceed. Summonses were issued on 25 November 2013. The central questions concerned the statutory starting date, the identity of the prosecutor, the certificate, and disclosure of the material supporting it.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were correct because the informations were laid within the period required by section 31(1)(b) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006.
2. The statutory question was whether, within six months before the informations were laid, evidence had come to the prosecutor’s knowledge which the prosecutor thought sufficient to justify proceedings. The question was not whether the respondent had concluded its investigations.
3. The statutory language required a judgment about whether prosecution was justified, rather than merely whether there was a prima facie case. That judgment could properly take account of the defendant’s interview or written statement, including matters relevant to mitigation, improvement in animal husbandry, or the need for a livestock-keeping ban.
4. Following RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702, the prosecutor was the County Council as the collective prosecuting body, but the relevant knowledge was that of the individual authorised to decide whether prosecution should proceed. The Council was entitled to establish an internal system identifying the appropriate level of seniority. Ms Faulkner’s decision on 5 August 2013 was a genuine prosecutorial decision, not an artificial transfer of papers.
5. A certificate under section 31(2) could be issued after a time-limit challenge. It was not essential, since the prosecution could instead prove by factual evidence who made the decision and when. The certificate’s date was therefore immaterial. Disclosure of the internal report should have been ordered below, but the report could not have assisted the claimant.
6. The questions in the stated case were answered accordingly. The claimant was ordered to pay £6,000 inclusive of VAT towards the prosecution’s costs.

The appeal was brought by way of case stated from convictions by Warwickshire Justices. The Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.