PS v RS

Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 permits financial relief in England after a foreign divorce where England and Wales is the appropriate venue and the foreign provision is inadequate. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the statutory factors concerning the parties’ connections, foreign provision, enforceability and available property.

Where the English connections are very strong, the application may be approached as if the divorce had occurred in England. There is no requirement of exceptionality, hardship or serious injustice, and relief is not confined to the minimum necessary to remedy injustice. The court retains a broad discretion, subject to the welfare of children, the ceiling imposed by the provision that would have been made in English proceedings, and the reasonable needs of the spouses.

The wife sought financial remedy orders under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 following the parties’ Egyptian divorce. Her earlier English financial application had been dismissed after the court recognised the Egyptian divorce. She was later granted leave under section 13 of the 1984 Act; an application for permission to appeal that decision was refused.

The parties had lived in England for almost the whole marriage, had become British nationals, and had children educated in England. The wife contended that the husband had concealed assets and that the Egyptian proceedings had not provided adequate financial relief. The central issues were whether England and Wales was the appropriate venue and, if so, what financial provision should be made.

1. Venue and jurisdiction. The court held that England and Wales was clearly the appropriate venue under section 16. The parties’ marriage, family life, residence, employment, children and substantial assets were principally connected with England. The Egyptian connections were materially less substantial. The Egyptian orders had provided no adequate financial provision and were not a sufficient reason to refuse relief.
2. Approach under Part III. Applying Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] 1 FLR 1813, the court treated sections 16, 17 and 18 as imposing interrelated duties. It considered the venue question separately from the decision whether to make an order, while recognising that the factors overlap. Forum non conveniens did not apply. There was no requirement of exceptionality, hardship or serious injustice, and the court was not limited to the minimum provision needed to remedy injustice.
3. Because the English connections were very strong, the application was properly treated as if it were made in purely English proceedings. The court therefore exercised its broad discretion under section 17, applying the incorporated section 25 factors. The relevant limits were the children’s welfare, the provision which would have been made had the proceedings occurred in England, and provision for the spouses’ reasonable needs.
4. Financial findings and division. The husband had failed to give full and frank disclosure. The court found that substantial sums transferred to his sister and niece remained his, and that he continued to own two Dubai flats. Drawing reasonable inferences from deliberate concealment was permissible, consistently with Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829.
5. The wealth had been accumulated substantially during the marriage and there were no factors justifying departure from equality. The court ordered transfer of the CC property to the wife, transfer of the HPW property to the husband, and payment of a £350,000 lump sum. The life policies were also transferred. The pension-sharing application was adjourned, with the husband restrained from disposing of the NHS pension pending further consideration.
6. The husband was ordered to pay the wife maintenance of £1,800 per month, less sums received through the Child Support Agency or Child Maintenance Service.

The judgment records that the wife was granted leave to apply under section 13 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 by Hedley J on 13 December 2012. Permission to appeal that decision was refused by Thorpe LJ on 7 February 2013. The present judgment determined the substantive financial remedy application at first instance.