Webb Resolutions Ltd v E-Surv Ltd

The court may revisit an order made on an application heard without one party, but the power should be exercised sparingly. A renewed application for permission to appeal must comply with the mandatory seven-day period in CPR 52.3(5). Where an extension is sought after default, the court should apply the approach in Andrew Mitchell MP v News Group Newspapers Limited: first assess whether the default is trivial; if not, require a good reason; and then exercise the discretion having regard to the need for efficient litigation and finality. Delay caused by ordinary administrative or professional pressures will rarely amount to a good reason. A serious and avoidable default will not ordinarily be excused, regardless of the prospective merits of the proposed appeal.

The claimant had settled a negligent property-valuation claim on terms that the defendant would pay its costs. After a detailed assessment, the defendant unsuccessfully sought permission to appeal. Permission was refused on paper, but the defendant later obtained from Blair J an extension of time and permission to renew the application orally, following an unrepresented hearing.

The claimant applied under CPR 23.11 to set aside Blair J’s order. The issues were whether the order should be revisited, whether the renewed application was out of time under CPR 52.3(5), and whether an extension should be granted.

1. Application to set aside. The court had power under CPR 23.11(2) to set aside or vary Blair J’s order because the claimant had not been represented at the hearing. Such power should be exercised sparingly, having regard to the warning in Jolly v Jay and the resource considerations identified in M A Lloyd & Sons Limited v PPC International Limited.
2. Time limit. CPR 52.3(5) required a request to renew permission to be filed within seven days after service of notice that permission had been refused. The date on which the order was received did not itself cause the later default. The relevant delay began after receipt of the notice, and the application for an extension was made substantially out of time.
3. Relief from default. Although CPR 52.3(5) contained no express sanction, the court applied the approach in Andrew Mitchell MP v News Group Newspapers Limited. The default was not trivial: the defendant had exceeded the permitted period by about three times. The reasons relied upon, including the time needed for internal advice and instructions, were not a good reason. The default was blatant and avoidable, and would not have been excused even under the less robust pre-Jackson approach.
4. Disposition. The claimant’s application was allowed. Blair J’s order was set aside. The defendant’s appeal was out of time and permission to extend time was refused.

First-instance decision. The judgment describes an earlier detailed assessment and subsequent permission decisions, but no appellate history for the present claim.