AA v London Borough of Southwark

A landlord cannot obtain an administrative warrant of possession where six years or more have elapsed since the original possession order without first obtaining a judge’s permission. That requirement remains applicable where execution has been stayed, suspended or postponed. A warrant issued without permission is invalid, and its execution may amount to an abuse of process.

Public landlords must comply with their eviction and goods-storage procedures. Significant departures may make an eviction unlawful and support claims in conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, negligence, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and under article 8. Where goods have no readily ascertainable market value, compensation may be assessed by reference to what provides just compensation for their loss.

The claimant was a secure social-housing tenant of the defendant local authority. After a possession order made in 2006 had been repeatedly suspended or postponed, the defendant obtained and executed a warrant in April 2013 without first seeking a judge’s permission, although more than six years had elapsed since the original order.

The claimant was evicted and all possessions left in the flat were removed and destroyed. He claimed damages for unlawful eviction, destruction of goods, conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, negligence, breach of contract and breach of article 8. The defendant contended that the trial had been confined to assessing replacement-value damages for the destroyed goods and that the eviction issues had already been determined. The court considered the scope of the pleaded claims, the effect of previous procedural orders and the legality of the eviction and subsequent conduct.

1. Warrant of possession. The original possession order was made on 13 November 2006. The later orders under section 85(2) of the Housing Act 1985 stayed, suspended or postponed execution, but did not replace the original order for the purposes of CCR 26r5(1)(a). The six-year period therefore ran from the original possession order. The Hassan-form orders affected the date for possession, not the separate requirement for permission to issue a warrant.
2. Judicial control. The defendant was required to make both any application to fix a date for possession and a separate application for permission to apply for the warrant. The permission requirement provided important judicial scrutiny in an aged possession case. The warrant was issued without that permission and was therefore invalid. Its execution was unlawful and an abuse of process.
3. Conduct of the eviction. The defendant’s mandatory procedures required appropriate attendance, notice, inspection, inventory, photographing and safe storage of possessions. The significant departures from those procedures, together with the absence of proper disclosure and the destruction of the claimant’s possessions, rendered the eviction and disposal unlawful. The subsequent handling of the claimant’s applications involved further abuse of process.
4. Liability. The evidence established concerted action by several officers to secure the eviction by unlawful means, to seize and destroy the claimant’s possessions and subsequently to conceal what had occurred. The claimant therefore established conspiracy. The relevant officers also committed misfeasance in public office, and the defendant was vicariously liable. The defendant was liable in negligence for the destruction of the possessions, for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and for breach of article 8 of the ECHR as given effect by the Human Rights Act 1998.
5. Damages and procedure. The pleaded claims had not been cut down by the interim and case-management orders. The claimant could in principle recover special and general damages, aggravated and exemplary damages, contractual and tortious damages and equitable remuneration, subject to proof and avoidance of double recovery. The remaining remedy and damages issues were subsequently settled.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier interim and county-court applications concerning the eviction, but none determined the substantive claims or constituted an appeal from a final decision.