Holland v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

In determining whether demolition in a Conservation Area should be permitted, a decision-maker may consider both the harm caused by demolition and the benefits of proposed redevelopment. A policy resisting demolition does not prevent that assessment where it also requires consideration of the replacement development.

Challenges to an Inspector’s planning judgments under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 288 face a high threshold. The court does not rehear the planning merits. A decision letter need address the principal controversial issues and need not recite every item of evidence, provided it intelligibly explains the decision.

The claimant challenged the Secretary of State’s Inspector’s decision allowing appeals against refusal of planning permission and Conservation Area consent for demolition of an existing modernist dwelling and construction of a replacement house.

The challenge alleged misinterpretation and irrational application of Greenwich Unitary Development Plan policies D16 and D17, unlawful consideration of the proposed replacement development, irrational assessment of the dwelling’s heritage significance, failure to consider evidence, and inadequate reasons.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant failed to establish any error of law in the Inspector’s decision.
2. Under section 72 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, the decision-maker had to pay special attention to preserving or enhancing the character or appearance of the Conservation Area. The Inspector correctly treated the Conservation Area as a designated heritage asset and the dwelling as a non-designated heritage asset under the National Planning Policy Framework.
3. Policy D17 did not require demolition to be refused merely because the existing building made some contribution to the area. The Inspector was entitled to find that the landscaped site made the principal positive contribution, while the dwelling had little group value and very limited individual significance. She was also entitled to consider whether the replacement would preserve or enhance the Conservation Area. The explanatory text to D17 enabled comparison of the existing and proposed development.
4. The Inspector’s conclusion that the proposal would preserve the Conservation Area and cause no harm to the designated heritage asset was open to her. Consistently with South Lakeland District Council v Secretary of State [1992] 2 AC 141, section 72 did not prohibit development causing no adverse effect on the area and otherwise unobjectionable on planning grounds.
5. A section 288 challenge is not a merits appeal. Applying Newsmith v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 74, and Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P & CR 26 and Tesco v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759, the evaluation of competing evidence and the exercise of planning judgment belonged to the Inspector. Her conclusions had an evidential basis and were not irrational.
6. Applying South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953, the Inspector was not required to set out all the evidence or every material consideration. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision letter made the principal planning judgments and their basis clear.

First-instance statutory challenge under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 288(1)(b) and section 63 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. The application to quash the Inspector’s decision was dismissed.