Bank St Petersburg & Anor v Arkhangelsky & Ors

A trial should be adjourned where, viewed at the time of the application, the existing timetable offers no realistic prospect of a fair and orderly hearing. The court must balance prejudice caused by delay against the parties’ entitlement to a fair trial. Litigants in person remain subject to procedural rules, but the court must apply them with vigilance to avoid unfairness. Earlier warnings enforcing a timetable do not prevent reconsideration where subsequent events materially alter the practical prospects of trial. Pending appellate proceedings may be relevant where their outcome is likely to affect representation, funding, the issues, or the trial estimate.

The claimants brought proceedings concerning a long-running dispute also litigated in the BVI and Russia. The trial had previously been adjourned from January 2014 to 1 May 2014. The defendants, acting without legal representation, sought a further adjournment until after 1 December 2014, citing continuing interlocutory litigation, pending appeals, difficulties obtaining funding and representation, and incomplete evidence. The claimants opposed the adjournment and sought strict unless orders requiring witness evidence by 10 March 2014. The court had to decide whether a fair and orderly trial could proceed in May and whether immediate sanctions were appropriate.

1. Adjournment. The defendants’ application was granted. The court accepted that adjournment of a long trial, particularly for a second time, should be approached with considerable reluctance, and that delay itself causes prejudice. Those considerations were outweighed by the practical reality that the defendants were not close to trial readiness.
2. The court was required to assess the position as it stood at the hearing. Subsequent interlocutory battles had substantially consumed preparation time, while the defendants faced serious difficulties in obtaining representation and evidence, preparing for the forthcoming appeal, and arranging their participation in the trial. These circumstances constituted a material change from the position considered in November 2013.
3. Although much of the defendants’ difficulty resulted from their own conduct, that was only part of the overall picture. The court also considered the effect of the claimants’ interlocutory applications, the funding consequences of the pending appeal, and the difficulties of obtaining evidence from Russia. A trial commencing on or soon after 1 May 2014 had no real prospect of being fair, orderly, or consistent with the overriding objective.
4. Litigants in person remain subject to the procedural rules, but the court must remain vigilant to ensure that their application does not cause unfairness. The defendants’ conduct was criticised, but they remained entitled to a fair trial.
5. The May trial date was vacated and no replacement date was fixed. The matter was to be restored after the Court of Appeal hearing, when the trial date and timetable could be reconsidered. The claimants’ proposed unless orders were refused because witness-statement deadlines would need recalibration. The court indicated that final, possibly unless, orders might be made once a new trial date was fixed, but that the form proposed was inappropriate.
6. The existing regime governing applications for legal expenses from proceeds of the surrendered policy was continued, subject to three days’ notice and the stated consequences concerning any appeal. The court considered the separate cross-undertaking issue resolved by the claimants’ clarification.

The judgment records that the trial had previously been adjourned to 1 May 2014 by an earlier judgment dated 14 November 2013. An appeal concerning matters arising from that decision was listed in the Court of Appeal for 8 and 9 April 2014. This court vacated the May trial date and directed that the matter be restored after the appeal.