Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Haigh & Ors

A local authority may obtain an order under section 34(4) of the Children Act permitting it not to arrange contact where contact is contrary to the child’s best interests. The order releases the authority from its obligation to promote contact but does not prevent it arranging contact if circumstances change. The child’s wishes and feelings, the risk of distress or harm, the parent’s conduct and the continuing circumstances must be evaluated. A section 91(14) order is a procedural filter, not an absolute prohibition. It may be made where prolonged litigation itself threatens the child’s welfare and peaceful development.

The local authority applied for continuation of an order under section 34(4) permitting it not to arrange contact between the mother and X, together with protective injunctions, an exclusion zone and a section 91(14) order. X was subject to a care order and lived with her father. The mother maintained that earlier findings were wrong and had repeatedly sought contact in breach of court orders. X consistently expressed fear of her mother and a wish for matters to remain unchanged. The central issues were whether continued restrictions on contact and the requested protective and filtering orders were in X’s best interests.

1. The applications were granted. Orders were made for two years under section 34(4) of the Children Act, together with non-molestation and exclusion orders. A section 91(14) order was made for three years.
2. Section 34(4) is permissive. Where contact is not in the best interests of a child, the local authority must seek the court’s permission not to promote or arrange it. The order releases the authority from that obligation but leaves it able to permit direct or indirect contact if the child’s circumstances or wishes change.
3. Contact must be assessed by reference to the child’s welfare. Contact may properly be restricted where it would cause harm, distress or detriment. X’s settled placement, consistent wishes and feelings, fear of her mother, and the mother’s continuing inability to accept the findings underlying the care order justified the continuation of the no-contact arrangement.
4. The protective orders were proportionate to the need to prevent deliberate or accidental encounters and to secure X’s wellbeing and peace of mind. The exclusion zone had been reduced and was a reasonable response to the risks identified.
5. A section 91(14) order operates as a filter. It does not permanently prevent an application; the mother must first obtain leave. Eight years of litigation, and the anxiety and disruption further proceedings would cause X, justified a three-year order covering her transition to secondary school.
6. It was unnecessary and inappropriate for X, aged ten, to give evidence or undergo a psychological assessment. Her wishes had been expressed clearly and consistently to the social worker, and exposing her to further litigation would have been distressing.

The judgment records earlier care proceedings, in which a care order was made, and subsequent protective orders made by the High Court. No appellate decision concerning the present applications is stated.