Kaziu & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Naturalisation obtained by fraud is not generally a nullity. Nullification is confined to the narrow category of impersonation, where the grant was made to a person identified by materially false and deceitful core identity characteristics.

Those characteristics ordinarily include name, date of birth and nationality, or country and place of birth. The fraud must be material to the grant. Innocent errors, pseudonyms, or lies concerning matters such as the merits of an asylum claim ordinarily engage deprivation, not nullification.

Whether a grant is a nullity is a question of precedent fact for the court. The Secretary of State must prove the relevant facts. The statutory deprivation procedure, including its appeal mechanism, does not eliminate the limited common-law category recognised by the Court of Appeal.

Three Albanian nationals had been naturalised as British citizens after claiming to be Kosovans. One had also used a false name and date of birth; the others had used false dates of birth or nationality. They had each obtained indefinite leave to remain before applying for naturalisation.

The Secretary of State later notified each claimant that the naturalisation was a nullity because it had been obtained by impersonation. The claimants sought judicial review, arguing that the statutory requirements for naturalisation had been met and that any fraud should be addressed only through deprivation proceedings, with a right of appeal.

The central issues were the scope of the limited nullity jurisdiction recognised in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Mahmood and related authorities, whether the false identity details amounted to impersonation, and whether prior grants of indefinite leave to remain altered the result.

1. Nullity and deprivation. The claims were dismissed. The court was bound by the Court of Appeal authorities to recognise a limited category in which naturalisation is a nullity. In such a case no citizenship was ever obtained and the statutory deprivation procedure does not apply.
2. Meaning of impersonation. The relevant question is whether the grant was made to X while the application represented X as Y. The core identity characteristics for this purpose are ordinarily name, date of birth and nationality, or country and place of birth. These characteristics operate together. A materially false and deceitful representation concerning one of them may mean that the person who received the grant was not the person described in it.
3. The fraud must be material to the grant. Innocent errors, innocent pseudonyms, misunderstandings about nationality, and lies concerning matters such as the substance of an asylum claim or whether the applicant was a refugee do not, without more, establish impersonation. Such matters may support deprivation proceedings instead.
4. Whether a grant is a nullity is a question of precedent fact for the court. The Secretary of State cannot determine the issue merely by forming a reasonable view. If disputed, she must prove the facts establishing impersonation.
5. The prior grants of indefinite leave to remain did not prevent nullification. Although each claimant met the statutory residence and leave requirements on the information known when naturalisation was granted, that did not overcome the binding authorities on naturalisation obtained by impersonation. The statutory concept of being in breach of the immigration laws and the good-character requirement did not themselves determine the nullity issue.
6. The naturalisations were therefore nullities. The court also noted, without deciding the issue, that a genuine relationship relied on for naturalisation may itself be a crucial identity characteristic. It expressed concern about the uncertain effects of nullification on derivative citizenship, but that issue was not necessary to the decision.

Not stated in the judgment.