RO v A Local Authority & Ors

In adoption and placement proceedings, adoption remains an order of last resort. The court must decide whether the child’s welfare makes adoption necessary, applying the high threshold that nothing else will do. It must evaluate every realistic option through a global, holistic and multi-faceted assessment, weighing each option’s advantages and disadvantages against those of the alternatives. A family placement does not reduce that threshold, although continued family relationships may be a significant benefit. Where a parent opposes adoption, consent may be dispensed with only where the child’s welfare imperatively requires it under the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

The local authority sought a placement order and an order under section 28 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 authorising F’s placement in the United States with her maternal aunt and uncle, with a view to a Convention adoption. F’s father opposed those applications and sought an order that F live with him, his partner and her half-brother.

The court considered the welfare evidence, the father’s ability to meet F’s emotional needs, the proposed kinship placement, and the consequences of adoption, including termination of the father’s parental status. The central issue was which realistic care option best promoted F’s welfare throughout her life.

1. Outcome. The father’s application for a residence order was dismissed. His consent to placement for adoption was dispensed with. A placement order was made in favour of the local authority, and an order under section 28 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 authorised placement outside the jurisdiction with the maternal aunt and uncle.
2. The court’s paramount consideration was F’s welfare throughout her life under section 1(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and sections 1(1) and 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. The court considered the welfare checklist and the Article 6 and Article 8 rights of F and her father. Where the child’s rights and the parent’s rights were in tension, the child’s rights prevailed.
3. Adoption was an order of last resort. The court applied the guidance in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 and Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. The family nature of the proposed placement did not lower the required threshold.
4. The court had to identify the realistic options and evaluate each globally, holistically and in a multi-faceted way. Each option required assessment of its own positive and negative features, followed by comparison with the alternatives. The relevant evidence had to address the options realistically available and the child’s particular welfare needs.
5. The father offered the advantages of care by F’s surviving parent and residence with her half-brother. However, the court found that he lacked the insight and reliability required to meet F’s significant emotional needs, could not consistently put those needs first, and faced continuing uncertainty concerning his immigration status. The maternal aunt and uncle could provide stable, secure and emotionally appropriate care within F’s family, while preserving contact with her father and other relatives.
6. Under section 52(1)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the statutory requirement that permitted dispensing with parental consent had the Strasbourg meaning of necessity. On the evidence, only adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle met F’s welfare needs, so nothing else would do.

First-instance decision. The judgment states that it should be read with the judge’s earlier judgment delivered on 26 March 2013, but gives no citation for that decision.