HM Attorney General v Iteshi

An Employment Appeal Tribunal may make an indefinite restriction of proceedings order where it is satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious Employment Tribunal or Appeal Tribunal proceedings or made vexatious applications in them. Repeated claims of a similar kind against different respondents may satisfy that test.

A period without fresh proceedings does not preclude an order. The tribunal must assess whether the litigant has genuinely changed course and whether an order remains necessary. Continued allegations impugning the integrity of the tribunal system may demonstrate that no such assurance can safely be drawn.

The Attorney General applied under section 33 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 for a restriction of proceedings order against Mr Iteshi.

Over four years, Mr Iteshi had issued 30 Employment Tribunal claims, principally alleging race and sex discrimination following unsuccessful job applications. The proceedings generated numerous applications and appeals. Most claims failed, were withdrawn, or were struck out, and the tribunal found that many had been pursued vexatiously.

Mr Iteshi had issued no new claim after November 2011, but his affidavit in the present proceedings maintained grave accusations against the Employment Tribunal system. The central issue was whether the statutory conditions were met and whether an indefinite order was necessary.

1. Application granted. The tribunal made an indefinite restriction of proceedings order under section 33 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

2. The statutory conditions were satisfied. Mr Iteshi had habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings in both the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and had made vexatious applications in those proceedings, without reasonable ground. His claims repeatedly followed unsuccessful applications for employment and were commonly accompanied by unsupported allegations of dishonesty, fraud, bias, forgery or manipulation. Many required detailed responses, pre-hearing evidence or extensive hearings despite being weak, hopeless or ultimately struck out.

3. The fact that the claims were generally directed at different employers and recruitment agencies did not prevent an order. The tribunal accepted the observation in Her Majesty's Attorney General v Mr S Kuttappan UKEAT/0478/05/RN that employment litigation may characteristically involve repeated claims of a like type against different respondents.

4. The tribunal also considered the particular exposure of employers and recruitment agencies to repeat discrimination litigation. Section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 can make it risky for them to avoid dealings with a previous claimant, because doing so may found a victimisation allegation. Since discrimination claims are ordinarily struck out at an early stage only exceptionally, the number of claims struck out reinforced the conclusion that they lacked reasonable grounds.

5. A cessation of new litigation can, as Attorney General v Barker [2001] FLR 759 illustrated, make an order unnecessary where there is a reliable basis to conclude that the conduct will not recur. That was not this case. Mr Iteshi's affidavit showed no change of heart and gave the tribunal no confidence that future litigation would be confined to claims justified by the facts. An indefinite order was therefore necessary.

not stated in the judgment.