HM Attorney General v Groves

A restriction of proceedings order may be made where the statutory conditions of habitual and persistent institution of vexatious proceedings or applications, without reasonable ground, are established. Vexatiousness is assessed objectively. Repeated similar employment claims against different respondents, automatic meritless appeals, disregard of procedural orders, and litigation causing disproportionate expense and harassment may demonstrate the requisite pattern.

The tribunal must then exercise its discretion by balancing access to justice against protection of respondents and public resources. An order under Employment Tribunals Act 1996 section 33 is a filter for meritorious future proceedings, not an absolute bar. That restriction is compatible with Article 6 where it is justified and proportionate.

The Attorney General applied to the Employment Appeal Tribunal under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 for a restriction of proceedings order against Mr Groves. Mr Groves did not attend the hearing, having supplied written submissions which the Tribunal considered.

The application relied principally on 19 employment tribunal claims and numerous appeals, largely arising from unsuccessful job applications and alleging disability discrimination or victimisation. Many claims had been dismissed, struck out, withdrawn after respondents had incurred expense, or pursued on appeal without an arguable point of law. The central issue was whether that history satisfied the statutory conditions and, if so, whether an indefinite order should be made.

1. Application granted. The Tribunal made an indefinite restriction of proceedings order under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. It also refused Mr Groves permission to appeal because his pre-emptive application disclosed no arguable point of law.

2. The statutory gateway requires proof that the person has habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications. If that threshold is met, the Tribunal retains a discretion whether to make an order.

3. Applying Attorney General v Barker [2001] FLR 759, vexatious proceedings have little or no legal basis and cause inconvenience, harassment and expense out of proportion to any likely gain. In employment litigation, Attorney General v Roberts UKEAT/0058/05 shows that persistence may consist of repeated like claims against different respondents rather than repeated claims against one opponent.

4. The evidence established the statutory conditions. Mr Groves had brought a significant number of substantially similar discrimination and victimisation claims, many with no reasonable prospect of success. He repeatedly challenged adverse decisions by unarguable appeals, failed to comply with orders, withdrew claims only after respondents had incurred expense, and engaged in conduct found to be vexatious or abusive. The pattern was an automatic response to unsuccessful job applications, rather than a succession of claims reasonably assessed on their individual merits.

5. The order was proportionate and compatible with Article 6. Following Attorney General v Wheen [2001] IRLR 91, access to a court is qualified and must be balanced against the rights of those exposed to wholly unmeritorious claims. The order would screen, rather than prohibit, future proceedings. An indefinite term was justified because there was no reason to expect the conduct to cease and the order would protect respondents and scarce tribunal resources.

not stated in the judgment.