Masuma Rahman, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

A defect in an initial immigration decision may be cured by a later supplementary decision where the decisions, read together, adequately address the relevant family and private-life issues under Article 8 and the Immigration Rules.

In a public-law challenge, the question is whether the Secretary of State was entitled to reach the decision, rather than whether the Tribunal would have made the same assessment. An express reference to section 55 is not indispensable where the decision demonstrates sufficient consideration of the affected child’s circumstances and welfare.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal, dated 2 July 2013, to grant her leave to remain in the United Kingdom. A supplementary decision of 18 March 2014 considered her private life under the Immigration Rules and whether exceptional circumstances justified leave outside the Rules.

The applicant had lived in the United Kingdom with her aunt and younger sister after their mother returned to Bangladesh. Her sister had later received limited leave on compassionate grounds. The applicant alleged inadequate consideration of Article 8, the welfare of her sister, and the policy on requests for removal decisions.

The central issue was whether the two decision letters disclosed a public-law error in the Secretary of State’s assessment.

1. The judicial-review application was dismissed. The applicant could not meet the Immigration Rules. The initial letter’s failure expressly to address private life was remedied by the supplementary letter, so that the two letters together adequately considered family life, private life, and exceptional circumstances outside the Rules.
2. The approach to exceptional circumstances accorded with the guidance in MF (Nigeria) [2013] EWCA Civ 1192 and R (on the application of Nagre) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 720 (Admin). The Secretary of State was entitled to find that refusal would not produce unjustifiably harsh and disproportionate consequences. The evidence did not rule out reunion with the applicant’s father in Bangladesh. Her adulthood, education, prior life in Bangladesh, and ability to maintain contact with relatives in the United Kingdom were relevant considerations.
3. The Tribunal emphasised that attaining 18 was not a bright-line end to childhood or family links. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the applicant’s relationships with adult relatives had not been shown to exceed normal adult family ties, and that she did not have custody of her sister.
4. Although neither decision expressly referred to section 55, the supplementary letter showed clear awareness of the sisters’ circumstances, including the basis on which the younger sister had received leave. The omission of express reference to the younger sister’s interests did not prevent the conclusion from having been lawfully reached.
5. The Secretary of State was also entitled not to make a removal decision. The application did not include a dependent child under 18, and no exceptional and compelling reason for such a decision had been established.

This was a first-instance application for judicial review in the Upper Tribunal. Permission was granted on 27 January 2014 because the original decision letter did not clearly identify the factors considered under Article 8. The Secretary of State then issued a supplementary decision on 18 March 2014, which the Tribunal considered together with the original refusal.