Kallon v First Tier Tribunal (SEC) (Criminal Injuries)

Permission for a further appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. A disagreement with a tribunal’s assessment of evidence will not suffice where its conclusion was open to it and no arguable legal error is shown. Management action directed at the completeness of an arrest record does not, without more, establish that the arrest was unlawful or that excessive force was used. The court may disregard delay and consider the merits where appropriate, but permission remains subject to the applicable threshold.

The applicant claimed compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme for a fractured thumb allegedly sustained during his arrest. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority rejected the claim, finding that the police had not used excessive force. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal, finding no fracture, no established crime of violence and no excessive force.

The Upper Tribunal refused permission to judicially review that decision, both on paper and at an oral renewal. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was then refused on paper. The central issue on the oral renewal was whether the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice or disclosed another compelling reason for a further appeal.

1. Application refused. The court disregarded the fact that the application was substantially out of time and considered the merits.
2. The applicable question was whether the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or whether there was another compelling reason to grant permission. The applicant’s argument that the facts amounted to a crime of violence under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme did not satisfy that threshold.
3. The First-tier Tribunal had a full report from Sergeant Evans and had heard his oral evidence. Its conclusions about the alleged injury, the absence of excessive force and the investigation were conclusions open to it. They were not matters which the Court of Appeal could properly reverse on this application.
4. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to agree with the First-tier Tribunal and to leave the assessment of what inference should be drawn from criticisms of the arresting officer’s record keeping to the tribunal. Management action concerning the completeness of arrest notes did not imply that the arrest was wrongful or that force had been used recklessly. It therefore did not establish an arguable error of law.
5. The case was not appropriate for a second appeal. The oral renewal of permission to appeal was rejected.

• First-tier Tribunal: dismissed the applicant’s appeal under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, finding that no fracture or crime of violence had been established and that excessive force had not been used.
• Upper Tribunal: refused permission to judicially review the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, both on paper and after an oral renewal, and refused permission to appeal.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Gloster LJ refused permission on paper. On oral renewal, Longmore LJ refused permission to appeal.