Wombwell v James

In a proprietary estoppel case, reasonable reliance requires both actual reliance and reliance that was reasonable in all the circumstances. An appellate court considering permission should read the trial judgment fairly and as a whole. A lack of detailed treatment of every relevant factor does not establish an appealable error where the findings and evidence support the conclusion.

Where an assurance is clear and close to contractual in character, promising a property interest in return for expenditure or work, the equity may properly be satisfied by granting that interest rather than merely repaying the claimant’s investment. The court retains flexibility over the precise duration and terms of the interest, but the remedy must reflect the assurance and the circumstances.

The claimant alleged that her mother had repeatedly assured her that she would receive the upper flat in the family property if she repaired and converted it. She spent substantial sums on the works and gave up secure rented accommodation before moving into the flat.

The County Court at Central London found proprietary estoppel established and ordered the defendant to execute a 125-year lease. The defendant, now represented, renewed an application for permission to appeal, challenging the findings on reasonable reliance and the remedy, and raising a constructive-trust ground.

1. Permission to appeal refused. The court also refused a further stay. The constructive-trust ground added nothing to the issues already considered.
2. Proprietary estoppel requires both actual reliance and reliance which was reasonable in all the circumstances. The judge had expressly found reasonable reliance. Although she began by considering whether the claimant’s understanding of the assurance was reasonable, her reasoning, read as a whole, addressed reasonable reliance and was supported by the evidence. The defendant’s benefit from the works and from having her family living at the property was relevant. A fuller explanation of the factors would have been preferable, but no clear error of approach or conclusion was shown.
3. The remedy was also a proper exercise of the trial judge’s judgment. The assurance was clear and close to contractual in character: the upper flat was promised in return for carrying out the necessary repair and conversion works. The defendant’s will, although revocable and not a testamentary contract, supported the conclusion that this was how she intended the claimant to be benefited.
4. In determining how to satisfy the equity, the judge had flexibility over matters of detail, including the precise duration and terms of the lease. The grant of a long lease could provide more in financial terms than repayment of the claimant’s expenditure, but it reflected the substance of the assurance. No principled basis for challenging the 125-year lease was identified.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed oral application for permission to appeal refused. A further stay was also refused.
• County Court at Central London: proprietary estoppel established and the defendant ordered to execute a 125-year lease of the upper flat in favour of the claimant.