Hussain v The London Borough of Waltham Forest

For homelessness under section 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996, “other violence” is not confined to physical violence. It includes threatening or intimidating behaviour, or abuse, directed at the applicant and sufficiently serious to give rise to psychological harm. The conduct must be more than merely anti-social, offensive or upsetting. Psychological harm is not a technical or medical requirement, but ordinarily means more than transient distress. A review officer who applies a physical-violence-only test, or fails clearly to explain why accepted conduct does not meet the statutory threshold, acts unlawfully. The matter should ordinarily be remitted where the statutory assessment is entrusted to the housing authority and circumstances may have changed.

Ms Hussain rented a house from a housing association. She alleged persistent racial harassment and serious anti-social behaviour by a neighbour’s son, including threatening gestures, intimidation and damage to property. She applied to the Council under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, contending that it was unreasonable for her to continue occupying the property.

The Council’s review officer upheld the decision that she was not homeless. On her appeal under section 204, the County Court quashed that decision and remitted the matter for a fresh review under section 202. The Council appealed. The issues were the meaning of “other violence” in section 177(1), whether the review officer applied the correct test, and whether remittal could be avoided.

Appeal dismissed. The Council was required to conduct a fresh review of the homelessness decision. The fresh review did not have to be undertaken by the same officer.

1. Lord Justice Underhill, with whom Lord Justices Briggs and Moore-Bick agreed, held that “other violence” in section 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 includes more than physical violence. It covers threatening or intimidating behaviour, or abuse, where the conduct is sufficiently serious that it may give rise to psychological harm. The conduct must in some sense be directed at the applicant. It must be more than merely anti-social, offensive or upsetting.
2. The statutory structure supports a single concept of “violence”. “Domestic violence” is a sub-category identified by the relationship between perpetrator and victim, rather than by a narrower form of conduct. The reasoning in Yemshaw v Hounslow London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 3, [2011] 1 WLR 433 therefore supported extending the broader understanding of violence to “other violence”. The physical-violence-only approach in Danesh v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1404, [2007] 1 WLR 69 was not followed.
3. Psychological harm is not a formal statutory or medical requirement. Decision-makers need not seek a technical diagnosis. The concept ordinarily involves more than transient upset or distress, although it may overlap with diagnosed psychiatric injury.
4. The review officer likely proceeded on the erroneous basis that only physical violence could satisfy section 177(1). Alternatively, he failed to explain clearly why the accepted intimidation and emotional upset did not establish the statutory probability of violence. The decision was therefore legally defective.
5. The Court declined to substitute its own merits decision. Parliament had entrusted the assessment to the Council, and more than two years had passed since the original application. The decision was accordingly remitted for reconsideration.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the Council’s appeal and directed a fresh review of the decision that Ms Hussain was not homeless.
2. Central London Civil Justice Centre (County Court): on 17 January 2014, Mr Recorder Steynor allowed Ms Hussain’s section 204 appeal, quashed the review decision and remitted the matter for a fresh section 202 review.