NC (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where an immigration application is refused under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules, the Secretary of State bears the burden of establishing the relevant grounds on the balance of probabilities. Hearsay evidence from an overseas verification team may discharge that burden where the fact-finding tribunal is entitled to regard it as reliable. Guidance stating that written confirmation should ideally be obtained is not an absolute requirement; its absence goes to evidential weight. Whether the evidence is sufficient is ordinarily a question for the fact-finding tribunal and does not ordinarily raise an error of law. A second appeal cannot proceed merely because the appellant disputes that assessment. Permission requires an important point of practice or principle or another compelling reason.

The applicant sought further leave to remain as a Tier 4 (General) Student. The Secretary of State refused the application on grounds including alleged false bank statements and failure to establish the required funds. A separate English-language ground was not pursued before the First-tier Tribunal.

The First-tier Tribunal found that the Secretary of State had discharged the burden of proof and dismissed the appeal. The Upper Tribunal rejected the further appeal, finding that written bank confirmation was not an absolute requirement and that the applicant’s own bank letter did not clearly refute the verification evidence. The Court of Appeal considered a renewed application for permission to appeal on a second appeal. The central issues were the sufficiency of the evidence, the Article 6 challenge, and whether the proposed appeal raised an important point of practice or principle or another compelling reason.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was dismissed.

1. The First-tier Tribunal had directed itself correctly on the burden and standard of proof. Where refusal was under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules, the Secretary of State bore the burden of establishing the relevant ground. The applicable standard was the balance of probabilities.
2. The published guidance stating that the issuing authority should ideally confirm in writing that a document was not genuine did not impose an absolute requirement. The absence of written confirmation was a matter going to the weight of the evidence.
3. The sufficiency and weight of the evidence were primarily matters for the fact-finding tribunal. They did not ordinarily give rise to an error of law. The verification report recorded information from the applicant’s bank that the debits and credits did not match its records. In the absence of any reason to suppose that information was inaccurate, and where the applicant had failed to produce sufficiently clear contradictory evidence from the bank, the tribunals were entitled to find that the burden had been discharged.
4. The Article 6 challenge failed for the same reason. The evidential assessment disclosed no error of law.
5. On a second appeal, a dispute about whether evidence had sufficient weight did not amount to an important point of practice or principle or provide another compelling reason for granting permission. The application was therefore dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): rejected the applicant’s further appeal.
• First-tier Tribunal: found that the Secretary of State had proved that the financial information was inaccurate and dismissed the applicant’s appeal.