Hyde & Ors v North East Lincolnshire Council

On a renewed application for permission to appeal a summary judgment, the court must consider whether the proposed appeal has a realistic prospect of success or whether there is another compelling reason for it to be heard. Historical allegations may be assumed to be true, but liability must still be assessed against the standard of care applicable at the time. Where the relevant records are effectively complete and expert evidence establishes no realistic prospect of proving breach, allowing the claim to proceed would serve no proper purpose. Sympathy for the claimant’s experience is not itself a compelling reason for a trial or an appeal. Permission was therefore refused where the evidence presented insurmountable obstacles to establishing breach of duty.

Colleen Hyde and Liza Morley brought claims against North East Lincolnshire Council for damages arising from alleged sexual abuse by their father between about 1960 and 1978. They alleged negligence and breach of statutory duty, including failures by social workers to respond appropriately to disclosures made in 1968 and 1971.

On 4 June 2014, HHJ Owen QC, sitting as a High Court judge, granted the Council summary judgment. The claimants sought permission to appeal. Elias LJ refused permission on the papers, and the claimants renewed the application before the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the evidence disclosed a realistic prospect of establishing breach of duty, or any other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

1. Application refused. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused because the proposed appeal had no realistic prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. The court proceeded on the basis that the claimants’ allegations of sexual abuse were true. The issue was whether the Council’s conduct fell below the standard required by the tort of negligence or breached a relevant statutory duty. That assessment had to take account of the standards of social care and professional knowledge prevailing when the events occurred, rather than applying modern standards retrospectively.
3. The available documentary material appeared to be complete, or as complete as it could be by the time of trial. The experts initially disagreed, but after reviewing the full medical and documentary history and meeting together, their final views were unanimous. The initial report supporting the claimants’ position had proceeded on an incomplete record.
4. In those circumstances, the claimants faced insurmountable obstacles in proving breach. There was no realistic prospect of showing that the response to the 1971 disclosure fell below the agreed standard. The decision not to take the matter further in 1968 could not realistically be shown to have been unreasonable on the available evidence. The possibility that another social worker might have adopted a different course did not establish a breach.
5. The claimants’ continuing hurt and the court’s sympathy could not justify allowing an action which was bound to fail to proceed to trial, or justify permission to appeal. The formal order was: Application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On a renewed application, permission to appeal from the summary judgment was refused. Elias LJ had previously refused permission on the papers.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Lincoln District Registry: HHJ Owen QC, sitting as a High Court judge, granted the Council summary judgment on 4 June 2014.