Yusuf v London Borough of Lewisham

On a second appeal in homelessness proceedings, permission may be granted where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason, and has a reasonable prospect of success. It was arguable that a housing authority discharging its duty to secure suitable accommodation under the Housing Act 1996 must consider suitability, including statutory overcrowding, even if the applicant had not raised overcrowding before leaving. The Court of Appeal did not determine the merits. Permission was granted because the issue was important and arguable, and the continuing homelessness of the applicant and his children supplied a compelling reason.

The appellant, a father with two children, had been accepted as owed a homelessness duty. His family was placed in one room at a hotel, with shared kitchen and bathroom facilities. After he spent several days away while the children had contact with their mother, his possessions were removed and the locks were changed. The authority treated its duty as discharged under section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996. Its review decision confirmed that conclusion and rejected the appellant’s overcrowding complaint.

His appeal to Central London County Court was dismissed by His Honour Judge Freeland QC. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether permission should be granted to argue that the authority had to consider the accommodation’s suitability and statutory overcrowding when discharging its duty, even though the appellant had not raised the issue before leaving.

Permission to appeal was granted. The Court of Appeal dealt with the permission application only and did not finally determine whether the authority’s review decision was lawful.

1. The proposed appeal raised an important point of principle for the purposes of the second appeals test in CPR 52.13(2). The court also considered that the issue had a reasonable prospect of success and that the continuing homelessness of the appellant and his children was a compelling reason for granting permission.
2. For permission purposes, the court accepted that the hotel room was arguably, and on the appellant’s case clearly, statutorily overcrowded. Two persons aged 10 or over of opposite sexes, who were not living together as husband and wife, were required to share the room. The relevant criterion was found in section 325 of the Housing Act 1996.
3. It was arguable that the authority’s duty to secure suitable accommodation under sections 206 and 210(1) required it to consider whether the accommodation was suitable when deciding to discharge the duty under section 193(6)(d). That issue could arise whether or not the applicant had previously raised overcrowding.
4. The authority had assessed the family as requiring three bedrooms but provided one room. It had not told the appellant that the accommodation was regarded as suitable or that he could request a review of that suitability under section 202(1)(f). Those matters supported the argument that his failure to raise overcrowding before leaving did not necessarily absolve the authority from considering suitability.
5. The court also identified an arguable anomaly concerning discharge under section 193(6)(b). If the authority relied on intentional homelessness from the accommodation, it would have to consider whether it was reasonable for the appellant to continue occupying it, including the fact of statutory overcrowding. The court referred to Harouki v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2007] EWCA Civ 100.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 17 December 2015, Lady Justice Gloster granted permission to appeal.
2. Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Freeland QC dismissed the appellant’s appeal after hearing it on 19 February 2014 and delivering judgment orally on 24 February 2014.